Pdf e liu overwhelming regional security concerns

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Unformatted text preview: st their foreign and domestic policies to guarantee regime survival in the face of regional unrest. The future replacement of either or both countries’ governments, should this occur, will probably alter rather than eliminate their rivalry, which is based on a variety of factors in addition to the differing systems of government. The Background of Saudi-Iranian Relations. 113 Last printed 9/4/2009 7:00:00 PM Oil DDW 2012 1 Saudi Prolif Yes 114 Oil DDW 2012 1 Saudi Arabia can buy or build a nuclear weapon to deal with threats Ladha, experience at Harvard’s Project on Managing the Atom and Ploughshares , will be a PhD Candidate at The Fletcher School, 12 Rizwan Ladha, experience at Harvard’s Project on Managing the Atom and Ploughshares , will be a PhD Candidate at The Fletcher School, Spring 12, [“A Regional Arms Race? Testing the Nuclear Domino Theory in the Middle East,” The Fletcher School – al Nakhlah – Tufts University, http://kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/142912/ichaptersection_singledocument/66c667f8-b61749d2-9e9b-ba5067eb77dd/en/43F8F8EF81014262AB2A119709E495E3.pdf] E. Liu Overwhelming regional security concerns drive the Saudi position on Iran’s nuclear program. In June 2011, Saudi Prince Turki alFaisal declared that an Iranian nuclear bomb would “compel Saudi Arabia… to pursue policies which could lead to untold and possibly dramatic consequences.” An official close to the prince later clarified his remarks, saying: “If Iran develops a nuclear weapon, that will be unacceptable to us and we will have to follow suit.”17 These statements echoed the private remarks of Saudi King Abdullah, who claimed in 2008 that if Iran developed nuclear weapons, “everyone in the region would do the same, including Saudi Arabia.”18 In fact, as far back as 2003, Saudi Arabia launched an internal strategic review to determine the feasibility of developing nuclear weapons. To date, an extended deterrence guarantee by the U nited States to Saudi Arabia has provided reassurances that Washington would come to the aid of Riyadh, should the latter be attacked with weapons of mass destruction . The strength of that guarantee may be strained, however.19 It was also revealed in 2003 that Sa udi Arabia might have signed a secret agreement with Pakistan, whereby Islamabad would provide Saudi Arabia with nuclear weapons technology in exchange for cheap Saudi oil.20 This suggests that under duress, Saudi Arabia might decide to buy, rather than build, a nuclear weapon.21 Saudi Arabia does maintain an interest in developing nuclear energy22—which it theoretically could reroute toward a weapons program—but to date, Riyadh has demonstrated a desire to forgo domestic uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing capabilities, which are the two channels through which a country can produce a nuclear weapon.23 Nonetheless, Saudi Arabia might be motivated to develop a nuclear program to gain regional prestige ,24 and certainly has the economic resources to develop the requisite technologies to produce nuclear weapons. At the very least, it could build a nascent nuclear program under the ostensible justification of generating nuclear power to diversify its domestic energy mix, with the option to later weaponize. 115 Last printed 9/4/2009 7:00:00 PM Oil DDW 2012 1 Terminal – Southwest Asian War 116 Oil DDW 2012 1 Southwest Asian war escalates to biological and nuclear weapons Russell, senior lecturer in the Depar...
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This note was uploaded on 01/30/2013 for the course ECON 101 taught by Professor Burke during the Spring '13 term at Southern Arkansas University.

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