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Running head: GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATION INCONSISTENCIES 1 Government Communication Inconsistencies Before and After Hurricane KatrinaPeterUniversity of Maryland Global Campus
GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATION INCONSISTENCIES 2Government Communication Before and After Hurricane KatrinaI agree that the possibility that overhauling the Posse Comitatus Act became evident after Hurricane Katrina in August 2005 with the absence of communication, proper procedure, and command relations amongst local, State, and Federal officials (Hermer 2005). Governor Blanco was not accustomed with the state of emergency procedure when she requested Federal assistance out of sequence and too late. Federal government’s managerial process met delays when the Governor contacted the President and asked for “everything you got” (Gheytanchi, 2007). White House officials did not want to overrule the Governor’s authority of robbing a female Democrat’s power. Generating a Special Response Forces office for natural disaster relief will precisely unify the local Law Enforcement, State, and Federal communication interactions, following proper procedures in order, and significantly reducing recovery time.Local Law Enforcement Ineffective Throughout Crisis
GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATION INCONSISTENCIES 3Systems are put in place that after the initialemergency occurs, local emergency departmentsarrive, i.e., Fire Department, Police, and the MedicalResponse Team in order to quickly assess theimmediate situation and initiate their training skills[CITATION Win05 \l 1033 ]. Following the attacks on September 11, 2001, the City of New Orleans established a Critical Incident Response Plan (CRIP) with four stations spread out through the city. This would allow continuous response efforts in the event they had to evacuate the primary office. In all this planning and to my disbelief, no one considered the levy’s breakingand flooding the entire city to include the four CRIP locations. The U.S. District Attorney’s office later improved the lessons learned to improve overall CRIP readiness. The list they came up with to make survivable and able to withstand anything are: “(1) carefully analyze the topography of the district (or appropriate parts of the district, depending upon size), as well as itsgeographical features and proximity to water, geological fault lines, transportation infrastructure,weather patterns, and other relevant features (including historical geological and meteorological trends and events); (2) carefully analyze all possible terrorist targets (domestic and foreign), including important transportation, power, and other critical infrastructure facilities, passages, bridges, roads, tunnels, dams, power plants, and fragile levee systems; petrochemical exploration, production, and refining faculties (or contiguous clusters of such facilities); military installations; large sports and other entertainment arenas capable of holding large numbers of people; large buildings, especially government buildings and facilities of all kinds; monuments;