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commission on fiscal imbalance 合集

19 82 however blchliger and frey 1993 p 231 note that

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Unformatted text preview: tion more than disparities in income per capita or differences in per capita public expenditures. 2. 6. For each ratio, the min or max Canton of reference is a different canton, except for Nidwald and Zoug, which appear twice with the minimum. Cantons with minimum indices are: Zoug on income and profit, Nidwald on wealth and capital and Valais on motor vehicle. Cantons with maximum indices are: Jura on income, Valais on wealth, Neuchâtel on profit, Glaris on capital and Berne on motor vehicles. Valais has the highest fiscal burden on wealth and the lowest on motor vehicles. This seems to indicate that the Cantons have definitely different ideas, first, on the relative tax burden within each tax source that can be asked from their own taxpayer compared to the average taxpayer across the Cantons and, second, on the relative burden of taxation which can be asked from each revenue source. There is no nation-wide concept of uniformity of individual tax burden, as in the case of Germany for example. EQUALIZATION The differences in the Cantons in terms of size, geography, population and economic potential are so great that, without equalisation measures, fiscal federalism would perform under regional disparities which would be intolerable. Therefore, the federal government intervenes to correct the primary distribution of resources between the Cantons with three main policy measures: fiscal equalisation, agricultural aid policy and assistance to mountain areas, with the purpose of 19 strengthening structurally weak regions. It is necessary, at this point, to stress the fact that, in Switzerland, there are no constitutional provisions and no claims from the cantonal governments or the citizenry that equalisation measures should compensate entirely for the differences between the Cantons in order to obtain identical economic or fiscal conditions. The pragmatic objective is to render regional disparities politically acceptable so that remaining differences do not endanger the cohesion of the Confederation. 19 82 However, BLÖCHLIGER and FREY (1993, p. 231) note that there is no overall co-ordination of regional equalisation measures, and there are also a number of measures with indirect redistributive effects which exacerbate regional disparities. For example, though central government procurement is not intended to be redistributive in nature, it benefits mainly industrialised Cantons with already higher-than-average NIC (JEANRENAUD, 1985). Commission on Fiscal Imbalance According to the 1959 federal law on equalisation, the original objective was to enable the Cantons to provide minimum acceptable levels of certain public services without much heavier tax burdens in some cantons than in others. Equalisation related to policies aimed at correcting fiscal imbalance, whether it resulted from differences in the revenueraising capacities of the Cantons or because, in some jurisdictions, the relative unit cost of providing some defined levels of services was above the national average. Eventually, the fiscal capacity appr...
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