commission on fiscal imbalance 合集

1998 guatemala 1993 mexico 1997 philippines 1992

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Unformatted text preview: ited States. 167 Commission on Fiscal Imbalance FIGURES 11-12-13-14 Figure- 11: Composition of Subnational Revenues and Grants in Europe and Central Asia Figure- 13: Composition of Subnational Revenues and Grants in OECD Countries Australia 1998 Albania 1998 Austria 1997 Azerbaijan 1998 Belgium 1997 Canada 1995 Belarus 1998 Denmark 1995 Bulgaria 1998 Finland 1997 Croatia 1998 France 1997 Germany 1998 Czech Republic 1998 Iceland 1998 Estonia 1998 Ireland 1996 Italy 1998 Former Yugoslavia 1990 Luxembourg 1997 Hungary 1998 Netherlands 1997 Norway 1997 Latvia 1998 Portugal 1997 Lithuania 1998 Spain 1996 Poland 1998 Sweden 1998 Switzerland 1997 Romania 1997 United Kingdom 1998 Russian Fed. 1995 United States 1997 0% Tax Revenue 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Other Revenues Transfers from other levels of Government Figure- 12: Composition of Subnational Revenues and Grants in East Asia and the Pacific 0% Tax Revenue 20% Other Revenues 40% 60% 80% 100% Transfers from other levels of Government Figure- 14: Composition of Subnational Revenues and Grants in Latin America and the Caribbean Bolivia 1998 China 1997 Brazil 1994 Indonesia 1993 Chile 1998 Malaysia 1997 Costa Rica 1996 Mongolia 1998 Guatemala 1993 Mexico 1997 Philippines 1992 Nicaragua 1995 Thailand 1997 0% Tax Revenue 168 Peru 1998 20% Other Revenues 40% 60% 80% 0% 100% Transfers from other levels of Government Tax Revenue 20% Other Revenues 40% 60% 80% 100% Transfers from other levels of Government Commission on Fiscal Imbalance There are three key factors in the design of intergovernmental fiscal transfers: the size of distributable pool, the basis for distributing transfers, and conditionality (Bird, 2000). Determining the distributable pool has an important impact on the stability of the intergovernmental fiscal relations system. Sharing a fixed percentage of all central taxes is a better way of establishing transfer system rather than sharing on an ad hoc basis. Sharing must be based on the basis of a formula. Discretionary or negotiated transfers are unstable and unpredictable in nature. The formula for revenue sharing should take needs and capacity into consideration. Once the first two factors have been sorted out, the last question is whether the transfer should be made conditional on a measure. Expenditure conditionality ensures that the transfer amount is spent on a specified service. On the other hand, performance conditionality links transfers to a performance criteria. FIGURE 15 Figure- 15: Composition of Subnational Revenues and Grants in Sub Saharan Africa Botswana 1994 Mauritius 1998 South Africa 1998 Zimbabwe 1991 0% Tax Revenue 20% Other Revenues 40% 60% 80% 100% Transfers from other levels of Government Source: International Monetary Fund. Government Finance Statistics Year Book 1998, Country Tables. 5.4. Subnational Borrowing/Debt There are three primary reasons why subnational borrowing can be considered as an appropriate tool for subnational public finance: 1. Intergenerational equity: The benefits of certain investment p...
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