commission on fiscal imbalance 合集

219 commission on fiscal imbalance bibliography

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Unformatted text preview: lways possible or is insufficiently defined. In our capacity as economists, we also deplore that a large part of the reforms is closely scrutinized from a legal standpoint but that the fiscal, budgetary and economic repercussions are not subject to thorough evaluation. These are questions that affect the daily lives of citizens. The second conclusion, pertaining to form, concerns the price paid by the federal government and taxpayers to reach agreement. We note that the federal government systematically saves the agreements as soon as fixed budget transfers come to the fore and the “loser” blocks the negotiations. The federal government then offers the loser financial compensation and an equivalent financial transfer is granted to the winner. The discrepancies between the parties concerned thus remain the same, but the federal government does not come out of the process unscathed. This was true of the Saint-Éloi agreement and the definition of changes in the “negative term”. We question the soundness of this method. Taxpayers risk bearing increased administrative costs stemming from the decentralization of certain taxes. If decentralization has the advantage of drawing the government closer to the citizen, it nonetheless engenders higher costs since it cancels out economies of scale and denies certain rules of efficiency (such is the case with the calculation of the real estate tax and personal income tax). Such costs will inevitably be reflected in the amount of tax due and there is no guarantee that such costs will be offset by gains in efficiency related to decentralization. Our analysis has highlighted the need to closely monitor the use to which are put the regions’ broader fields of jurisdiction and the new financial means acquired by the communities. Above all, we must avoid, on the eve of the next round of negotiations, finding some of the interlocutors in such a financial stranglehold that they may not allow themselves any other demand. Therefore, it is essentially a question of ascertaining in a timely fashion the possible detrimental effects of tax competition and making provision for adequate responses and solutions thanks to efficient fiscal management tools. If all entities have such management tools, our federalism could evolve from an antagonist era to a more constructive era between different but mature entities, voluntary cooperation being a possible result of it. 73 74 75 See Lambert, Tulkens et al. (1999). De Bruycker (2001). See the article by W. Bourton in Le Soir of July 14, 2001 concerning the Brussels region. 219 Commission on Fiscal Imbalance BIBLIOGRAPHY Bayenet, B., Feron, M., Gilbert, V. and Thys-Clément, Fr. (2000). Le fédéralisme budgétaire : Mode d’emploi, Éditions de l’Université Libre de Bruxelles. Bourton, W. (2001). “Gérer l’après-Lambermont. Bruxelles va s’offrir un simulateur fiscal,” Le Soir, July 14, 2001. Brassine, J. (1994). La Belgique fédérale, Dossiers du CRISP n°40, CRISP, Brussels. Bricman, Ch. (1994). “Les nouveaux mécanismes de financement” in Les réformes institutionnelles de 1993, vers un fédéralisme achevé ?, Actes du colloque organisé dans la salle du Conseil de la RBC les 26 et 27 mars 1993 par le centre de droit public de la faculté de droit de l'ULB, pages 193-213, Bruylant, Brussels. Cattoir, Ph. (1998). Fédéralisme et solidarité financière. Étude comparative de six pays, CRISP, Brussels. Cattoir, Ph. and Verdonck, M. (1999). ...
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