commission on fiscal imbalance 合集

Commission on fiscal imbalance合集

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Unformatted text preview: present a common package to the federal government. The objective of the CCMF is to discuss fiscal/financial matters which are of common interest to all or a large number of the Cantons. It has been organised not so much to co-ordinate and harmonise fiscal and financial affairs of the Cantons (horizontal relations), as to intervene more persuasively in federalcantonal relations and to interfere in federal-only fiscal and financial matters. The Conference is not a constitutional institution. Yet, fiscal matter cannot be decided at the federal level without previous consultation of the CCMF. It is a powerful pressure group, regularly consulted by the federal Finance Administration. It has been successful in negotiating global financial packages in which the point of view of the Cantons differs from that of the federal government. It has played an important role in shaping federal finance, the federal tax system and tax harmonisation, which was to remain “formal”, and has a dominant position in federal equalisation policies (DAFFLON, 1995). ♦ The Conference of the Canton (CdC) also exerts a powerful balance against federal policy proposal. The whole process of a New Fiscal Equalisation package, which is presently under discussion, is a joint venture of the Federal Ministry of Finance and the CdC. 3 4 In most Cantons, constitutional or legislative initiatives are possible on taxation, current or capital expenditures, which require a minimum number of citizens' signatures. Referenda against capital, unique or recurrent expenditures are also possible. The institutional and legal conditions about the distinctions between compulsory or facultative referendum, unique and recurrent expenditure, capital or current expenditure, the number of signatures required, the time allowed for collecting the signatures, differ widely from one canton to another. While the influence of referenda in general on the outcome of the public budget are known, the influence of the detailed cantonal referendum conditions, as a measure of budget orthodoxy, on public deficit and the indebtedness of the Cantons are actually under scrutiny in two studies (NOVARESI, 2001, University of Fribourg and PUJOL, 2000, University of Geneva). Also KIRCHGÄSSNER, FELD and SAVIOZ, 1999. New forms of inter-cantonal co-operation, called FOCJ for “Functional, Overlapping and Competing Jurisdictions”, are developed in FREY and EICHENBERGER, 1999. 65 Commission on Fiscal Imbalance ♦ At the local level, the main incentives for inter-communal co-operation are, traditionally, economies of scale and regional spillovers and, more recently, limited managerial skills in many small municipalities, especially when local governments function as production agencies for the centre (Cantons or Confederation), as for example in the field of national environmental policies. Contrary to other federal countries, there are no de-concentrated “federal agencies” which act as regional producers of services for the provision of public services that have to respect minimum standards set by the central government...
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This note was uploaded on 03/06/2013 for the course ECON 220 taught by Professor Paulo during the Spring '13 term at University of Liverpool.

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