commission on fiscal imbalance 合集

Furthermore transfers that were earmarked before were

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Unformatted text preview: nificantly higher than the current OECD average (13% in 1998). TABLE 3 TAX RECEIPT AND CONTRIBUTIONS – PERCENTAGE Administrative level Supranational level Central administration Local administrations Of which: Regions Provinces and municipalities Contributions TOTAL 1996 1999 2002* 1.2 55.3 8.0 0.8 57.6 12.2 0.8 51.4 19.4 4.9 3.1 35.4 9.1 3.1 29.4 15.5 3.9 28.4 100.0 100.0 100.0 Source : Ministry of Economy and Finance 253 Commission on Fiscal Imbalance TABLE 4 Table 4 - Regional own revenues- projection by ordinary region for 2001 Ordinary Regions IRAP Piemonte Lombardia Veneto Liguria Emilia -Romagna Toscana Marche Umbria Lazio Abruzzo Molise Campania Basilicata Puglia Calabria 5.709 15.102 6.110 1.688 5.911 4.271 1.602 782 7.212 1.018 216 3.198 371 2.280 995 Total Own revenues Petrol, gas Incom e tax Automobil excise share e tax 538 900 768 1.065 2.138 1.710 586 871 891 192 299 251 550 888 805 501 642 633 185 225 260 106 122 167 647 796 847 143 151 208 27 30 45 396 459 534 46 52 81 341 362 308 174 133 228 56.466 Tax or excise receipt/ total receipts Source: 72,6% 5.497 7,1% 8.070 10,4% 7.735 9,9% (billion liras) Total own revenues 7.915 20.015 8.458 2.430 8.154 6.047 2.272 1.177 9.502 1.520 318 4.587 550 3.291 1.530 Own revenues/Total revenues 76,2% 98,6% 79,9% 55,7% 81,6% 69,0% 67,0% 53,9% 78,1% 48,6% 36,9% 36,6% 36,9% 38,2% 30,8% 77.768 68,4% 100,0% Own calculation from P.Giarda , 2000 Regional and local authorities can borrow and issue bonds. Borrowing is regulated by the so-called golden rule, which has an indirect ceiling fixed by law (debt service cannot exceed 25% of total own revenues, and borrowing to finance current expenditure is prohibited). Very frequently, as happened very recently with regional health deficits, the central government covers year-end deficit overruns. The data reported in Table 1 and 3 suggest that the emerging institutional and financial arrangement being established in the Italian model reveals a comparatively high degree of decentralisation both on the expenditure and the revenue side. However regional and local government revenues are experiencing a higher sensitivity to the economic cycle than it used to be in the past when most transfers where earmarked and derived from general central state resources. Constraints on indebtedness are however relatively lax in particular if one considers that such arrangements have to be looked at within the framework of the observance of the European budget rules agreed under the European Stability and Growth Pact. 4. FISCAL AUTONOMY OF REGIONS As mentioned in the previous paragraphs, many changes took place during the nineties, both on the expenditure and the revenue side. In order to appreciate the dimension of these changes and also measure the current level of financial autonomy of Italian Regions, it is possible to compare data referring to the revenue structure and to the expenditure structure in year 1990 and 1999. During the reference period considered here the attribution to regions of higher resources was counterbalanced by the reduction of transfers from the central government to Regions. Furthermore, transfers th...
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This note was uploaded on 03/06/2013 for the course ECON 220 taught by Professor Paulo during the Spring '13 term at University of Liverpool.

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