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Unformatted text preview: ional taxes are highly volatile. An estimate of future changes in such revenues requires
a comprehensive statistical approach that does not come under the purview of this article.
Several estimates are circulating at present in which are contemplated variable hypotheses concerning (1) anticipated
growth rates in regional tax revenues (a growth rate sometimes equivalent to growth in GNI, sometimes equivalent to
inflation + 50% of growth in GNI, and so on); (2) per-capita change in personal income tax in each region (continuation
of the current trend or a recovery in the Walloon and Brussels regions); and (3) regional breakdowns of the newly
regionalized taxes. It is sufficient to observe the divergences in the results of these various estimates to understand that
further discussion will probably occur between regional entities in order to determine the criterion governing the regional
breakdown to be implemented. 68
70 71 See the report of the Conseil Supérieur des Finances (1998), page 117.
A cooperation agreement as contemplated by section 92(a), §2, of the special act of August 8, 1980 respecting institutional reform (cf. section 6 of the
special act of July 13, 2001).
It should be noted that the French precedent was highly useful in drawing attention to this potential problem. Indeed, following the decentralization of
the registration tax, one of the French departments cancelled this tax. Shortly thereafter, almost all leasing automobiles bore the number of this
department on their licence plates.
Mention should be made of estimates provided by the Facultés Notre-Dame de la Paix in Namur, the projections of the CEPESS, and those of the
Brussels region’s finance minister. 217 Commission on Fiscal Imbalance For these reasons, we have decided not to present summary tables of the effect on regional budgets of the Lambermont
However, we do believe that it is germane to mention that the effect of the new regionalization on certain taxes will not
be of the same magnitude in the three regions. It is the Brussels region that will undergo the most sweeping changes in
the structure of its revenues, because regional taxes account for a larger share of its revenues, essentially because of
the density of its built heritage. Prior to the Lambermont agreement, regional taxes accounted for roughly 20% of
Brussels’ overall revenues, as against 9% in Wallonia and 6% in Flanders. In the wake of the Lambermont agreement,
regional taxes will account for an estimated 50% of overall revenues in the Brussels region. Half of Brussels’ revenues
will depend on these taxes, compared with only one-third in the Walloon region and even less in the Flanders region,
because of the merging of the community and regional budgets. 5. CONCLUSION
The foregoing analysis leads us to draw a number of lessons from the recent institutional reform, both from the
standpoint of form and content.
With regard to content, we wish to answer three questions. Does the Lambermont agreement appear t...
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