commission on fiscal imbalance 合集

However since there is no well developed real estate

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Unformatted text preview: ture capacity, and revenue sources across subnational units in almost every country. These horizontal imbalances and fiscal disparities present challenges to fiscal decentralization reforms. Table 2 presents these striking variations across subnational governments’ expenditure capacity in a selected group of countries. The coefficient of variation in the last row is an indicator of fast growing economic inequalities across subnational governments in these countries. 149 Commission on Fiscal Imbalance TABLE 2 MEASURES OF HORIZONTAL IMBALANCE: PER CAPITA SUBNATIONAL EXPENDITURES India (97) (rupee) Russia (97) (ruble) China (97) Argentina (94) (yuan) (pesos) 1,946 3,762,600 6,857,226 1,410 Minimum 919 1,336,700 3,027,937 616 Maximum 3,407 30,543,500 27,413,257 4,665 0.39 1.17 0.77 0.62 Mean Coefficient of Variation Source: India: Author’s calculations based on data from the Indian Subnational Database, The Statistical Information Management and Analysis System, World Bank; China: Author’s calculations based data from Statistical Yearbook of China 1998; Russia: From Martinez-Vazquez and Boex (2001); Argentina: From Rezk (1999). Third, subnational revenues are not adequately responsive to changing needs and subnational governments lack the legal authority to levy some taxes that yield enough revenue to meet their needs. The size and pattern of subnational government taxation varies greatly from country to country (see Table 3). In many countries, subnational governments are authorized to assess and collect taxes, but determining tax bases and rates is the responsibility of the central government. For example, income and property taxes are intended to be the most important sources of revenue for subnational governments. However, since there is no well developed real estate markets, the collection of property tax is problematic in most of the developing countries. In many countries, property values are not updated regularly and the inflationary environment is an important hindrance on subnational governments' ability to generate a substantial revenue from property tax. On the other hand, taxes that expand with economic activity and expenditure needs is exclusively collected by central governments in many countries. Exceptionally, in a number of Latin American countries and India, industry and commerce tax are important sources of revenues for subnational governments (Bird, 1995). TABLE 3 TAX REVENUE ATTRIBUTABLE TO EACH TYPE OF GOVERNMENT 1997 1998 1997 1998 1997 1998 INCOME TAX INCOME TAX PROPERTY TAX PROPERTY TAX CORPORATE TAX CORPORATE TAX C Albania Belarus Bulgaria L 100.00% C 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 100.00% 50.01% 49.99% L 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 50.29% 49.71% C L 99.11% C 0.89% 99.66% L 0.34% C L 100.00% 0.00% C 100.00% L 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 100.00% 100.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 100.00% 100.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% Croatia 61.10% 38.90% 61.05% 38.95% 32.46% 67.54% 33.43% 66.57% 100.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% Czech Rep. 37.98% 62.02% 38.28% 61.72% 55.68% 44.32% 60.33% 39.67% 100.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% Denmark 44.88% 55.12% 42.35% 57.65% 39.38% 60.62% 44.53...
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This note was uploaded on 03/06/2013 for the course ECON 220 taught by Professor Paulo during the Spring '13 term at University of Liverpool.

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