commission on fiscal imbalance 合集

If such right to levy their own taxes will continue

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Unformatted text preview: he right of municipalities to vary their rates of the taxes on businesses and land. In particular, it would be feasible (and equitable) to allow states to levy a surcharge (in analogy to the church tax) on the national income tax collected in their jurisdictions, or preferably, an own tax on the federal income tax basis. This would be administratively easy to implement, it would render the state’s tax share more visible to the citizen-voter, and thus strengthen accountability. Of course, the corresponding revenue of this state tax or surcharge would be immune against applying the principle of solidarity, that is, against any form of interregional redistribution. It would remain exclusively at the disposition of the state authorities. Of course, the federal government would have to “make room” for such a state surcharge in order to keep the total tax burden on citizens constant. The realization of this proposal would require a constitutional amendment not only with regard to allowing the states to levy such taxes; it would also affect the present 50:50 partition rule for the vertical distribution of income taxes. If such right to levy their own taxes will continue to be denied to German states, this could lead to serious pressure to levy non-tax revenue—for instance student fees to finance education—which would undermine interregional solidarity in other ways. Moreover, in the era of the Internet, there are new possibilities of levying charges for public services according to the quid pro quo principle. It implies that new forms of raising own revenue are likely to emerge and expand. This would entail a continuing dilemma: If such extra revenue will remain out of the equalization mechanisms as established now, there will be a continuing debate on what the constitution means with “current revenue”—the basis for 30 31 This line of criticism was opened up in the mid-70s by Scharpf, Reissert, and Schnabel (1976). See also Rosenfeld (1999). Federal grants as a last step of equalization make sense only if they are understood to compensate for temporary, special burdens—as in the Grundgesetz. This is true for the transfers destined to alleviate the special situation of the new states. These transfers should be retained as a last (fourth) step in correcting state fiscal capacity. However, they should definitely, and anticipatorily, be phased out over time in order to underscore their temporary nature. 51 Commission on Fiscal Imbalance equalization. The “poorer” states will put pressure on the “richer” to have such revenue included in the mechanics of 32 interregional solidarity. If such revenue would be integrated in the interregional solidarity programs however—in other words: the states would forego this revenue that was derived from taxing their own citizens on the understanding that it would benefit the regional community—, this would eternalize the lack of incentives to mobilize own resources and to manage regional budgets more efficiently at the state level. Given the history of...
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This note was uploaded on 03/06/2013 for the course ECON 220 taught by Professor Paulo during the Spring '13 term at University of Liverpool.

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