commission on fiscal imbalance 合集

Second though centralized bureaucracies are viewed as

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Unformatted text preview: ts much larger neighbour, which – for most of the time – is unconcerned about, and ignorant of, developments in Scotland. There are parallels in that Canadian nationalism is, in part, defined relative to the United States (Helliwell, 2001). There is some similarity between the economic pressures from the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) and those from the EU, though a bigger difference is to be found in that increased economic integration is not presumed to involve either monetary or fiscal integration. The fiscal history of Canada and, especially, that of the United States, where federalism has been explicitly viewed as a restraint on government size, has led to much less concern about the fiscal viability and health of sub-national governments (Riker, 1996). There is much more willingness to leave fiscal discipline to the capital market, rather than the surveillance which has been adopted by Ecofin.38 Although the United Kingdom, unlike Canada, does not have a constitutional commitment to fiscal equalization, there is a deeply embedded political commitment to the principle of broadly equal standards of public service provision across the United Kingdom.39 The differences in provision which are now attracting increased attention are partly a consequence of political compromises and partly a reflection that the UK fiscal system has been non-transparent. Whereas Canada exhibits a high degree of revenue decentralization (Boadway and Watts, 2000), the United Kingdom will remain highly centralized. Indeed, the UK Government will simultaneously resist EU pressures for tax harmonization (arguing the case for tax competition) and devolved pressure for modest measures of tax decentralization (arguing that these would be distortionary). Even without EU pressures for tax harmonization, the UK Exchequer’s loss of revenue from tobacco and alcohol excises, together with the criminalization of parts of the distribution system, will lead to major reductions in excise levels, which are currently much higher than in the relevant parts of continental Europe. Distance provides less protection than in Canada for differentiated excise systems. Fourth, the UK Government has no power to spend its own money on devolved functions, so that, in this respect, the devolved bodies are more effectively protected from UK government intervention than are the Canadian provinces, which have long complained about the Federal Government’s use of its ‘spending power’ (Boadway and Watts, 2000) to override provincial policy preferences. An obvious caveat is that a UK government has control over the tax/transfer system and there might well be circumstances in which this could be used to override the policy preferences of devolved bodies. 37 38 39 276 This issue, of there being no English counterpart to generate formula consequences, already arises in the case of water and sewerage, privatized in England and Wales but not in Scotland and Northern Ireland. There has been considerable conflict between the UK Chancellor of the Exchequer (Gordon Brown MP) and Ecof...
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This note was uploaded on 03/06/2013 for the course ECON 220 taught by Professor Paulo during the Spring '13 term at University of Liverpool.

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