commission on fiscal imbalance 合集

The italian design is therefore meant to foster a

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Unformatted text preview: ural funds because they are expected to contribute significantly to the achievement of national program priorities. The indicators were defined to measure the degree of implementation of the reform and, at the same time, the capacity of local public administration to externalise or privatise some of their previous functions. As for integration and concentration, both criteria are based on the underlying assumption that when resources are limited, as they always are, there is only a restricted number of objectives that can be achieved and that, for each objective to be reached, all pertinent interventions have to be implemented following both a logical and temporal integration path. Economies both of scope and agglomeration should materialise, providing for a higher return from those interventions. It is also assumed that regional governments, through negotiation with central institutions and social partners, will be able to identify the path which is most pertinent to meet growth and employment targets estimated to amplify convergence. The indicators suggested here capture both aspects only partially, and imperfectly measure the principles that the plan intended to push forward. They have to be accepted as proxies. They do require, in particular integration, the capacity of regional and local administrations to identify ideas and implementation rules that are precise and clear enough to give substance to territorial integrated projects. 6.2. The performance reserve mechanism as a tool to foster competition and partnership The rules governing the implementation of the reserves aim at fostering both competition and partnership between different levels of government and within each managing authority (among different offices). For both reserves competition generally occurs in the second round of the performance screening process. All programs judged efficient according to the set of indicators and benchmarks defined qualify for the reserve allocated to them. Only if a program is found to be inefficient is the reserve allocated to that program made available for redistribution to its successful rivals. It is a second-degree competition mechanism, which is activated only after having allocated the reserve to efficient programs. As for the 6% reserve criteria of integration and concentration, a direct competition among administrations is already introduced in the first round by means of benchmark definition. For both indicators benchmarks are fixed on the basis of the average performance of all programs. In this case there will be, by definition, programmes that will not be allocated the full amount of the quota of the 6% reserve devoted to integration and concentration. Only those regional Operational Programmes which are ranked very close to the average will qualify for the allocation of a 0.8% for integration and a 0.6% for concentration, to which another 0.7% for integration and a 0.4% for concentration could be added if the programme performs better than the average.7 Therefore, while the first benchmark could be reached by any Operational Programme, the second benchmark can only be reached by best performing programmes. The Italian design is therefore meant to foster a higher degree of competition among administrations. Nevertheless, the second-degree competition rule and the introduction of “affordable” benchmarks allow for reducing the risk of excessively favouring those regions which, becau...
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This note was uploaded on 03/06/2013 for the course ECON 220 taught by Professor Paulo during the Spring '13 term at University of Liverpool.

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