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Unformatted text preview: maneuver to contain deficit and debt, as required to meet the Maastricht parameters. On
the contrary, the same aggregate remains stable for regions and local governments. At the same time, the share of
public expenditure kept at the central level decreases by 3.5 points and increases by the same amount in Regions and
local government, mainly privileging the former. 251 Commission on Fiscal Imbalance By the end of 97 the share of public expenditure (using both transferred and local resources) of sub-central level of
governments represented around 46% of total public expenditure.
Unfortunately it is not possible at the moment to provide data reflecting the impact of all the reforms that took place
during the nineties on the expenditure side since the decrees transferring personnel, goods and resources were
completed only at the beginning of 2001. At the same time such decrees do not yet implement some of the new changes
introduced with the constitutional law approved in March 2001.
Table 2 - Expenditure by functional category and by territorial partition - dati di competenza - percentage - 1999 Regions Total Special Regions - Total
Ordinary Regions - Total
Northern ordinary regions
Central ordinary regions
Southern ordinary regions Health
Education and social
55,6 Agriculture 4,7
Transportati and other
8,1 Other 15,9
12,6 Total 100
100 Source: CNR, Istituto di studi sulle regioni Expenditure pattern vary according to the different status of “special” and “ordinary” regions in Italy. Ordinary regions
devote 60% of their current and capital spending to health and social services while “special” regions have a much
higher incidence of administrative expenditure which reflects their different status.
A new constitutional law is going to be submitted to the Parliament for approval in Fall. The draft proposal contains the
provision for attributing exclusive legislative power to regions in matters such as heath, education (as far as regional
educational interest are concerned) and local police. Industrial policies and incentives, which are attributed to the
regions by the constitutional law of March 2001 are not considered part of regional competencies within the draft
proposal. The proposal also provides for the nomination of regional representative in the Constitutional Court. Until now
Constitutional Court members are nominated by the President of the Republic, by the Parliament and by the
Magistratura (Corps of judges).
The proposal eliminates mention to common minimum health services as a denominator for all regions and as an
objective to be guaranteed by the central state, through equalisation funds. It also introduces exclusive legislative power
for education but only limited to matters considered of regional interest while the central state keeps the competency on
defining national curricula, programs and standards. The content of...
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