commission on fiscal imbalance 合集

The criteria chosen to allocate european structural

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Unformatted text preview: Ministerial council and the President of the Regions, the second by the ministerial Council and representatives of mayors. They oversee all matters potentially of interest to the Regions and municipalities. They provide non compulsory and compulsory comments to law and decree drafts, to official documents and to decisions taken by various governmental, inter-ministerial and other institutional Committees. Commission on Fiscal Imbalance The rationale of the strategy lies in the idea that Southern Italy is endowed with significant natural, human and cultural resources, which lie largely idle and could be better used to produce a significant social and economic return. Proper economic exploitation of idle resources and the enhancement of relational capital within clusters, together with reduction of barriers to mobility and competition and the strengthening of communication, were chosen as policy priorities to create positive supply externalities and to reduce current diseconomies which negatively affect both expectations and investment productivity of private investors. This would induce, through positive expectations on growth rates, an increase in private investments and consequently a steady increase of employment rates. To succeed, this strategy needed to be implemented within an adequate institutional design. Moreover it had to be credible in order to convince private investors to make their investments before programme effects on territorial competitiveness became fully visible. The success of the strategy requires a general upgrading of public investment and Public Administration. The governance of the programme was therefore based on a set of rules aimed at reaching this objective by supporting at the same time competition and cooperation between different levels of government (central, regional and local government), but also within the same government level (among regions or municipalities). Competition was induced by implementing, within the framework of structural funds responsibilities, the allocation of clear responsibilities at different government levels as regulated by Bassanini I; by introducing a mechanism of rewards and sanctions previously agreed among regions; by defining clear operational targets; and by strengthening monitoring and evaluation functions. Partnership, both institutional and social, was necessary in order to allow the transfer of knowledge between different government levels and among private and public actors. Unlike responsibilities, it cannot be easily transferred from one level to the other via formal protocols. This asks for informal interactions among actors to be developed and encouraged. This new institutional model of public investment management was strengthened by the definition of a medium-term financial plan and the ex-ante determination of resources available to regions. This included the identification of the overall volume of available resources for 2000-2006 (budget funds, special domestic funds for lagging areas, European structural funds and national co-financing) and full disclosure of the criteria for dist...
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