commission on fiscal imbalance 合集

The ebb and flow of the allocation of relative

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Unformatted text preview: ed grants); and ♦ Specific purpose payments (tied grants). General revenue assistance was distributed to the States on fiscal equalisation principles. Some States experience expenditure disabilities as a result of relatively high per capita costs for the provision of public services. They may also experience revenue-raising disabilities as a result of their having relatively small per capita tax bases. The objective of fiscal equalisation is to compensate the poorer States for these expenditure and revenue disabilities (but not for the results of any inefficiencies arising from their own discretionary policies). The process attempts to achieve capacity equalisation not performance equalisation. The relativities upon which the distribution of general revenue assistance is based are recommended by the Commonwealth Grants Commission (CGC). In the determination of its relativities recommendations, the Grants Commission takes some account of Commonwealth specific purpose payments to the States, even though these are funds in the use of which the States have no discretion. There remained scope for negotiation between the two levels of government on funds allocation and these were conducted in Financial Premiers Conferences and in the Council of Australian Government. This latter body has a remit much broader than simply financial matters, dealing with such issues as the reforms designed to achieve a single, harmonised national market. 113 Commission on Fiscal Imbalance The process by which the arrangements existing at June 2000 were reached was a complex one. There could be said to have been two major themes to Commonwealth-State financial relations over the life of the Australian federation: 1. 2. The battle between the two levels of government over the allocation of taxing powers. This battle has been decisively won by the Commonwealth, as a result of the “temporary” coercive acquisition of sole income taxing powers (relating to both personal income and company profits) by the Commonwealth in the wartime conditions of 1942, and the interpretations of Section 90 of the Constitution by the High Court which have removed from the States the power to impose broad-based consumption taxes. The ebb and flow of the allocation of relative expenditure powers between Commonwealth and State Governments, with some Commonwealth governments pursuing centralist agenda while others have been more willing to yield independent power to the States. For detailed information on the history of federal financial relations in Australia see James (1992), Collins (1993), and Warren (1997 and 1999). To put the ensuing discussion in context, Table 1 presents a summary of Australian tax revenues classified by level of Government in the last year before the operation of the IGA. 114 Commission on Fiscal Imbalance TABLE 1 AUSTRALIAN TAX REVENUES, 1999-2000 $M $M % of total Aust. taxation COMMONWEALTH Taxes on income Individual income tax 83,710 42.6 Company income tax 29,516 15.0 Non-residents tax 1,276 0.6 114,502 Employers’ payroll taxes 58.3 3,434 Total taxes on income 1.7 TAXES ON PROVISION OF GOODS AND SERVICES Sales tax 15,644 8.0 Excises and levies 14,658 7.5...
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This note was uploaded on 03/06/2013 for the course ECON 220 taught by Professor Paulo during the Spring '13 term at University of Liverpool.

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