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Unformatted text preview: reserve indicators, the complete list is presented in annex B, while some examples are given
below for each block.
For institutional enhancement, among the different features of the administrative reform, the performance reserve
mechanism rewards the transition from the former normative-hierarchical approach to administration functioning to a
performance-oriented one where officials are delegated higher responsibilities and have to reach defined targets (see
Annex B, indicator B.1.1) and where such elements are part of a monitored contract. Along the same lines is the reward
for implementing an internal management control system (see Annex B, indicator B.1.2 ).
As highlighted previously, the success of the CSF depends also on the capacity of regional governments, to which the
implementation of most funds is delegated, to screen and select the interventions which are most pertinent for their
territory and to monitor and evaluate their impacts in terms of their contribution to improve supply externalities and
6 258 A complete and detailed description of Italian 4% reserve criteria and mechanism design is contained in the document agreed with the European
Commission and approved by the first objective 1 CSF Monitoring Committee on November 7, 2000 “QCS Obiettivo 1 – 2000-2006; Criteri e
meccanismi di assegnazione della riserva di premialità del 4%”
The Commission proposal for the 4% reserve is contained in “Implementation of the performance reserve for objective 1, 2 and 3” – Working
document 4 - Directorate General Regional Policy and Cohesion; Directorate G: Programme Coordination and Evaluation of Operations
A complete and detailed description of Italian 6% reserve criteria and mechanism design is contained in the 2000-2006 Objective 1 CSF (§6.5 and
annex D) and in the document “QCS Obiettivo 1 – 2000-2006; Criteri e meccanismi di assegnazione della riserva di premialità del 6%”
The concentration criterion applies only to regional administrations. Commission on Fiscal Imbalance intermediate objectives. A proxy for this is the indicator that measures the degree to which regional and central
administrations have set up and implemented monitoring and evaluation functions and equipped the responsible units
with sufficient qualified human resources to perform those functions (see Annex B, indicator B.1.4).
Increasing the competitiveness of southern regions cannot only be the result of the flow of qualified public investments,
even though these are present in conspicuous amounts, but is conditioned by the contextual implementation of other
policies which allow the Public Administration to provide good services. Competitiveness and market competition in
southern regions are among those policies. In this context, the proposal rewards the implementation of sector reforms
that spur competitiveness and market competition in public service provision such as in water and solid waste services
(see Annex B, indicators B.1.8 and B.1.9). These are services that will benefit considerably from struct...
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