Unformatted text preview: se of their history, tradition and dimensions can perform better than
others. Moreover, the access to single portions of the reserve, as it is the case for the 6% reserve, can provide the right
incentive even to the least efficient administrations to focus their efforts on a few indicators rather than on all, helping
them to reach at least a few results.
The competition fostered by the reserve also affects local governments. At least one third of the listed indicators
measure the performance of the regional territory and not necessarily of the regional institutions. Again, within the
framework of decentralised responsibilities, it is the overall performance of the territory that can help meeting the
benchmarks. The necessity to perform well for the 4% reserve system (for example in terms of financial and physical
implementation) and the wide share of resources dedicated in the 6% reserve system to indicators for which local
governments play an important role (integration, concentration, one-stop shop, implementation of the reform in water
7 In the case of central administration, for which only integration applies, those satisfying the first benchmark will be allocated a 1.4%, to which another
1% could be added if the second benchmark is reached. 259 Commission on Fiscal Imbalance and solid waste services) constitute incentives for regional administrations to set up an internal reverse reward system
according to which those local governments that help in getting the reward, will in turn get a share of it. Indeed, some
regional governments have already regulated and set up an internal reward system, and therefore reversed the incentive
scheme towards local governments and bodies.
The incentive scheme is part of a system where institutional and social interactions among levels of government and
actors play an important role in the definition of objectives and targets. The identification of patterns that are essential to
the success of the program was carried out by sharing experience, analytical results and knowledge by means of a
vertical and horizontal partnership. The main structure and indicators of both reserve proposals were discussed at least
one year before the formal approval of the CSF. Local governments, regional and central administrations had therefore
enough time to organise themselves and get their share of the reward. Because it was clear that it would have been
onerous for some of the less efficient administrations to produce the expected results (strengthening effectiveness on
screening, programming, monitoring, evaluating public investments and implementing them) a certain degree of flexibility
was introduced in the 6% reserve.
A strong incentive system such as the one described here, built into a process of decentralisation and reform of the
public administration, strengthens the exposure of regional and local administrations vis-à-vis their political market; it
helps on the one hand to reduce the degree of uncertainty which still c...
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