commission on fiscal imbalance 合集

These disparities are at the core of the swiss

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Unformatted text preview: d management, without widespread risks of failure. As a consequence, the power to decide and finance the provision of public services has remained largely (and jealously) in decentralised hands, in the Cantons or in the communes. Many forms of co-operative federalism have flourished in the last decades, whether in formal institutions like the inter-cantonal treaties ("concordats intercantonaux") or informal, like the inter-cantonal conferences of Ministers or high civil servants for various functions. However, the fairly extensive autonomy of cantonal and local governments for their finance is not unlimited. Competition between jurisdictions is a first limit. Second, many cantons have introduced their own constitutional rules with regard to (balanced) budget and debt limitation (section 4). Fiscal competition is partly softened by rules of tax co-ordination and harmonisation (section 5). However, autonomy in public expenditures, direct access to many revenue sources and, above all, differences in the Cantons' economic potential (see Table 1, columns 6 to 8) have led to relatively important regional disparities, expressed in the fiscal burden of the Cantons and in their financial capacity (Table 9 thereafter). These disparities are at the core of the Swiss equalisation policy, although there is no claim for perfect equality between the Cantons or the communes (section 6). 2. FISCAL DEMOCRACY In fiscal federalism, institutions play an important role in shaping the relations between the layers of government. It is therefore of interest to shed some light on the working of the institutions in Switzerland, particularly on the rules and principles, which govern the assignment of functions and revenue sources to decentralised jurisdictions. Four institutional characteristics are essential in the working of Swiss federalism: (1) the vertical division of power in the Constitutions, (2) direct democracy, (3) initiatives and referenda and (4) horizontal co-operation between governments at the cantonal and communal levels. 2.1. The vertical division of power The Swiss federal system emphasises the sovereignty of subcentral jurisdictions, i.e. the Cantons and the local communities. This sovereignty is derived from the federal and cantonal constitutions, which list not only the tasks of each government level, but also fix their right to levy some sorts of taxes. Thus, the assignment of competencies and revenue sources is guaranteed at each level of government. The vertical division of power, intended to prevent stable majorities from being able to exploit minorities, is strongly safeguarded in the Constitution (KNAPP, 1986; ZIMMERMANN, 1987). 63 Commission on Fiscal Imbalance Article 3 of the new Federal Constitution of April 18th, 1999 guarantees the Cantons' sovereignty in all the spheres in which the Constitution does not explicitly provide for the federal government's competence. Article 42 Cst defines in a restrictive manner the assignment of functions to the Confederation: "...
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This note was uploaded on 03/06/2013 for the course ECON 220 taught by Professor Paulo during the Spring '13 term at University of Liverpool.

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