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Unformatted text preview: The judgment that air is elastic can become universally valid, and thus be turned into a
judgment of experience, because of certain preliminary judgments that bring the intuition
of air under the concept of cause and effect.
If all our objectively valid synthetic judgments are analysed, it turns out that they
never consist in mere intuitions that are brought together in a judgment through mere
comparison. Always, a pure concept of the understanding has been added to the concepts
that are abstracted from intuition. This applies even to the judgments of pure mathematics,
including its simplest axioms. The principle ‘A straight line is the shortest path between
two points’ presupposes that the line has been brought under the concept of size. That
concept doesn’t come from intuition; it has its seat solely in the understanding, and serves
to get the intuition (of the line) ready for quantitative judgments to be made about it.
If we are to prove that experience is possible insofar as it rests on pure a priori concepts
of the understanding, we need a Ÿlist of these concepts. We arrive at this list through a
Ÿlist of basic kinds of judgments that we can make, because the pure concepts of the
understanding run parallel to those judgment kinds. . . .
-----------------------------------3 An easier example is: ‘When the sun shines on the stone, it grows warm.’ This is a mere judgment of
perception and contains no necessity, no matter how often I and others may have perceived this. But if I
say ‘The sun warms the stone’, ·which means that the sun causes the stone to become warm·, the concept
of cause is added to the perception and connects the concept of warmth necessarily with the concept of
LOGICAL TABLE OF JUDGMENTS
Apodictic TABLE OF CONCEPTS OF THE UNDERSTANDING
Necessity P URE PHYSICAL TABLE OF THE UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLES OF
Axioms of Intuition
Anticipations of Perception
Analogies of Experience 4
Postulates of empirical thinking generally Section 21a
If you are to grasp all this in a single thought, I must first remind you that our topic is not
where experience comes from but what experience contains. The former topic belongs to
empirical psychology, though even that would not suffice without the latter topic, which
belongs to the critique of knowledge and especially of the understanding.
Experience consists of intuitions, which belong to the sensibility, and of judgments,
which are entirely a work of the understanding. But the Ÿjudgments that the understanding
forms from sensory intuitions alone are far from being Ÿjudgments of experience. For a
judgment of the former kind only connects the perceptions as they are given in sensory
intuition, while a judgment of experience must express Ÿwhat is contained in experience in
general, and not merely Ÿwhat is contained in the mere perception (which possesses only 33
subjective validity). So a judgment of experience must add something to Ÿthe sensuous
intuition and Ÿthe logical tie-up of that intuition to others in a judgment (after it has been
made universal ·merely· by comparing ·this intuition with others·). What it must add is
something implying that the synthetic judgment is necessary and therefore universally valid
- ·not merely universal in the weak way that comes from comparing intuitions with one
another·. This added element can only be the concept that represents the intuition as a
suitable subject for one form of judgment rather than another.
Summing up: The business of the senses is to intuit; that of the understanding, to think.
Now, thinking is unifying representations in a consciousness, and this can be done either in
Ÿa contingent and subjective way or in Ÿa manner that is necessary and objective. Since
thinking is the same as judging, it follows that judgments are of two kinds: a judgment
may be merely
Ÿsubjective (when representations are related to one another only with respect to
one person’s consciousness),
or it may be
Ÿobjective (when the representations are related with respect to consciousness in
general, that is, with respect to every possible conscious mind).
The basic kinds of judgment are simply possible ways of unifying representations in a
consciousness; and when they serve as concepts, they are concepts of the necessary
unification of representations in any consciousness, which means that the judgments that
involve them are objectively valid. In experience, perceptions are synthetically but
necessarily connected in a consciousness; for them to be connected in this manner, they
must be brought under pure concepts of the understanding; so these concepts are required
if any judgments of experience are to be made.4
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