Spinoza, Ethics, Part 3

If someone x loves someone else y the more x imagines

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Unformatted text preview: tulate ourselves’, ‘gloat’, ‘silently boast’ or the like]. We try our utmost (by 33) to get a thing we love to us back, that is (by the note on 13) to bring it about that a thing we love should have pleasure accompanied by the idea of ourselves ·as cause·. So the greater the pleasure we imagine a loved thing to have on our account, the more this effort of ours is helped, that is (by 11 and the note on it), the greater the pleasure we have. But when we have pleasure because we have given pleasure to someone else who is like us, we regard ourselves with pleasure (by 30). Therefore, the greater the ·favourable· affect with which we imagine a thing we love to have towards us, the greater the pleasure with which we shall regard ourselves - which is to say (by the note on 30), the more we shall exult at being esteemed. 71 35: If someone imagines that a an object of his love x is united with someone else y by a bond of friendship as close as, or closer than, the bond that he used to have exclusively with x, he will hate x and envy y. If someone x loves someone else y, the more x imagines that y loves him the more he will exult at being esteemed (by 34), that is (by the note on 30), the more pleasure he will have. And so (by 28) x will try his utmost to imagine y to be bound to him as closely as possible. This effort - this appetite - is Ÿencouraged if he imagines another to want what he does (by 31). But in the case now in question, this effort - this appetite - is Ÿhindered by the image of y accompanied by the image of someone z with whom y is united. So (by the note on 11) x will have unpleasure, accompanied by the idea of y as a cause, together with the image of z; that is (by the note on 13), x will have hate towards y whom he loves, and at the same time towards z (by the corollary to 15), whom x will envy because of the pleasure z takes in y whom x loves (by 23), Note on 35: This hatred towards a thing we love, combined with envy, is called ‘jealousy’, which is therefore just a v acillation of mind born of love and hatred together, accompanied by the idea of someone else who is envied. Moreover, this hatred the jealous man has towards the object of his love y will be greater in proportion to the pleasure he usually derived from the love returned to him by y, and also in proportion to the affect he has towards z, the person with whom he imagines y has united himself. For if the jealous man hates z, he will thereby hate the object of his love y (by 24), because he imagines that y gets pleasure from what he (the jealous man) hates, and also (by the note on 15) because he is forced to join the image of the object of his love to the image of the object of his hate. This latter reason is found mostly in love towards a woman. For a man who imagines that the woman he loves has sexually surrendered herself to someone else will not only have unpleasure because his own desire is blocked, but will also be disgusted by her because he is forced to picture her in contact with the private parts (including the excretory parts) of the other person. To this, finally, is added the fact that she no longer gives the jealous man the warm welcome she used to offer him; and this saddens him too, as I shall now show. 36: Someone who recollects something by which he was once pleased wants to possess it in the same circumstances as when he first was pleased by it. Whatever a man sees together with something that pleased him will (by 15) be the accidental cause of pleasure to him. And so (by 28) he will want to possess it all, together with the thing that pleased him; which is to say that he will want to possess the thing with all the same attendant circumstances as when it first gave him pleasure. Corollary: If the lover has found that one of those circumstances is lacking, he will have unpleasure. [A demonstration is given, but hardly needed.] Note on the corollary to 36: When this unpleasure concerns the absence ·not of an attendant circumstance, but· of what we love, it is called ‘longing’. 72 37: The desire that arises from unpleasure or pleasure, and from hatred or love, is greater in proportion as the affect is great. Unpleasure lessens or hinders a man’s power of acting (by the note on 11), that is (by 7), it lessens or hinders the effort by which he tries to stay in existence; so it is contrary to this effort (by 5), and all a man tries to do when he has unpleasure is to try to remove it. But (by the definition of ‘unpleasure’ ·on page 61·) the greater Ÿthe unpleasure, the more of Ÿthe man’s power of acting that it is opposed to; and so the greater Ÿthe unpleasure, the greater Ÿthe power of acting that he will employ in trying to remove it; that is (by the note on 9), the greater the desire or appetite with which he will try to remove the unpleasure. Next, since pleasure (by the note on 11 again) increases or helps a man’s power of acting, it is easily demonstrated in the same way that the man who has pleasure wants nothing but to preserve it, and wants this more intensely the greater the pleasure is. Finally, since hate and love are themselves affects of unpleasure or of ple...
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