Spinoza, Ethics, Part 3

Note on 41 but if he believes that he has given just

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Unformatted text preview: n imagines he has given just cause for the other’s hatred, he will suffer shame (by 30 and the note on it). But this rarely happens (by 25).) First corollary: Someone who imagines one he loves to have hate towards him will be tormented by love and hate together. [Spinoza explains why; it is pretty obvious.] Second corollary: If someone imagines that another person towards whom he has previously had no affect has done him some harm, out of hatred, he will immediately try to return the same harm. If x imagines y to hate him, he will hate y in return (by 40), and (by 26) will try to think of everything that can bring unpleasure to y, and will be eager to bring it to him (by 39). But in the present case the first thing x imagines of this kind is the harm that he imagines y has done to him. So he will immediately try to harm y in the same way. 74 Note on the second corollary: The effort to harm someone we hate is called ‘anger’; and the effort to return a harm that has been done to us is called ‘vengeance’. 41: If someone imagines that someone loves him, and doesn’t believe he has given any cause for this, he will love ·that person· in return. This is demonstrated in the same way as 40. Note on 41: But if he believes that he has given just cause for this love, he will exult at being esteemed (by 30 and its note). This indeed happens rather frequently (by 25) and is the opposite of what I said happens when someone imagines that someone hates him (see the note on 40), This reciprocal love, and the consequent (by 39) effort to benefit someone who loves us and tries (also by 39) to benefit us, is called ‘gratitude’. So it is evident that men are far more ready for vengeance than for returning benefits. Corollary: Someone who imagines he is loved by someone he hates will be conflicted, having hate and love together. This is demonstrated in the same way as the first corollary to 40. Note on corollary to 41: But if the hate has prevailed, he will try to do evil to the person who loves him. This affect is called ‘cruelty’, especially if it is believed that the one who loves has given no ordinary cause for hatred. 42: Someone who has benefited someone else - whether moved to do so by love or by the hope of esteem - will have unpleasure if he sees his benefit accepted in an ungrateful spirit. Someone who loves a thing like himself tries his utmost to be loved by it in return (by 33). So someone who has benefited someone else from love does this from a tenacious longing to be loved in return - that is (by 34) from the hope of esteem, which is pleasure; so (by 12) he will try his utmost to imagine this cause of esteem, regarding it as actually existing. But in the case in question he imagines something else that excludes the existence of this cause. So (by 19) he will have unpleasure. 43: Hate is increased by being returned, but can be destroyed by love. Someone who imagines that someone he hates has hate towards him will feel a new hate (by 40) while the original hate continues. But if he imagines that the person he hates has love towards him, then to the extent that he imagines this he regards himself with pleasure (by 30) and tries to please the one he hates (by 29), that is (by 41) tries not to hate him and not to give him unpleasure. This effort (by 37) will be greater or lesser in proportion to the affect from which it arises. So if it is greater than his hate-caused effort to bring unpleasure to the thing he hates, then it will prevail over it and efface the hate from his mind. 44: Hate completely conquered by love gives way to love, and the love is therefore greater than if hate had not preceded it. The proof of this proceeds in the same way as that of 38. For someone who begins to love a thing he has hated - that is, used to regard with unpleasure - has pleasure because he loves, and to this pleasure which love involves (see its definition in the 75 note on 13) there is added a further pleasure arising from the fact that the effort to remove the hate-caused unpleasure is greatly helped by the accompaniment of the idea of the one he hated, ·who is now regarded· as a cause ·of pleasure·. Note on 44: Although this is so, no-one will try to hate a thing . . . . in order to have this greater pleasure ·when hate gives way to love·; that is, no-one will want to injure himself in the hope of recovering, or long to be sick in the hope of getting better! For everyone will always try to stay in existence and to avoid unpleasure as far as he can. If it were conceivable that a man should want to hate someone in order afterwards to love him all the more, he would always want to hate him. For as the hate intensified, so would the love, and so he would always want his hate to become greater and greater. . . . 45: If someone x imagines that someone y like himself hates a thing z that is also like himself (x) and that he (x) loves, he will hate that ·person· y. If y hates z, then z hates y in return (by 40); so x, who imagines that someone y hates z the o...
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This note was uploaded on 03/12/2013 for the course PHIL 105 taught by Professor Mendetta during the Spring '13 term at SUNY Stony Brook.

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