Spinoza, Ethics, Part 3

So i shall give these two special names of their own

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Unformatted text preview: will thereby (by 27) have pleasure (unpleasure) himself. But since (by II19 and II23) a man is conscious of himself through the states that make him act, this man will have, along with his pleasure (unpleasure), a consciousness of himself as the cause; which is to say that he will regard himself with pleasure (unpleasure). Note on 30: By the note on 13, love is pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause, and hate is unpleasure accompanied also by the idea of an external cause; so the pleasure and unpleasure spoken of in 30 are kinds of love and hate. [Adapting an expansion of the rest of this paragraph, proposed by Curley:] But love and hate, considered simply as such, involve only the idea of an external cause; whereas in the case treated in 30 my love (hate) has not only an external cause (the pleasure (unpleasure) of others), it also has an internal cause (namely, myself as the cause of the external cause, and thus as the cause of my love or hate). So I shall give these two special names of their own: I shall call pleasure accompanied by the idea of an internal cause ‘love of esteem’, and the corresponding unpleasure I shall call ‘shame’. I mean when the pleasure or unpleasure arise from the man’s thinking he is praised or blamed ·by others·. If it doesn’t come from that source, I shall call pleasure accompanied by the idea of an internal cause ‘self-satisfaction’, and the contrary unpleasure I shall call ‘repentance’. Next, because (by the corollary to II17) it can happen that the pleasure that someone imagines that he gives to others is only imaginary, and (by 25) everyone tries to imagine concerning himself whatever he imagines will give him pleasure, it can easily happen that someone who is universally disliked is proud of how much pleasure he gives (he thinks) to everyone. 31: If we imagine that someone loves, desires or hates something we ourselves love, desire, or hate, that will make us love, desire or hate it with greater constancy. But if we imagine that he is averse to what we love or loves what we hate, then we shall undergo vacillation of mind. Our imagining that someone loves something is (by 27) enough on its own to get us to love the same thing; but if we already love it, this imagining provides a new cause for our love, by which it is further encouraged. So we shall love the thing with greater constancy. Next, our imagining someone to be averse to something will make us averse to it (by 27). But if at the same time we love the thing, then we shall both love it and be averse to it, which is to say (see the note on 17) that we shall undergo vacillation of mind. Corollary: From this and from 28 it follows that each of us tries his utmost to bring it about that everyone loves what he loves and hates what he hates. . . . Note on: 31: This effort to bring it about that everyone goes along with one’s own loves and hates is really ambition (see the note on 29). And so we see that each of us, by his nature, wants others to live according to his temperament; when all alike want this, they 70 are alike an obstacle to one another; and when all want to be praised or loved by all, they hate one another. 32: If we imagine that someone enjoys something that only one person can possess, we shall try to bring it about that he does not possess it. Our imagining someone to enjoy something is (by 27 and its first corollary) enough to get us to love that thing and want to enjoy it. But in the present case ·where only one can possess the thing in question· we imagine the other person’s enjoyment of this thing as an obstacle to our own pleasure. Therefore (by 28) we shall try to stop him from possessing it. Note on 32: We see, therefore, that for the most part human nature is so constituted that men pity the unfortunate and envy the fortunate; and (by 32) when x envies y, he does so with greater hate the more he (x) loves the thing he imagines y to possess. So we see that the property of human nature that makes men compassionate also makes them envious and ambitious. Finally, if we consult experience we’ll find that it teaches all these things, especially if we attend to early childhood. For we find that children, because their bodies are continually in a state of equilibrium (so to speak), laugh or cry simply because they see others laugh or cry. And they want to imitate whatever they see others do. And, finally, they want for themselves everything that they imagine others find pleasing . . . . 33: When we love a thing like ourselves, we try our utmost to bring it about that it loves us in return. We try our utmost to imagine, above everything else, the thing we love (by 12). So if a thing is like us, we shall try to give it pleasure above all others (by 29); which is to say that we shall try our utmost to bring it about that the thing we love has pleasure accompanied by the idea of ourselves ·as cause·, that is (by the note on 13), that it loves us in return. 34: The greater the ·favourable· affect we imagine a thing we love to have towards us, the more we shall exult [gloriabimur = ‘congra...
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