Spinoza, Ethics, Part 3

That is apart from the unpleasure that was the cause

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Unformatted text preview: asure, it follows in the same way that the effort, appetite, or desire that arises from hate or love will be greater as the hate and love are greater. 38: If someone begins to hate a thing he has loved, so that his love is completely extinguished, then . . . . he will have a greater hate for it than if he had never loved it; and the greater his earlier love was, the greater his hate will now be. If x loves y and then starts to hate y, more of his appetites will be hindered ·by this hate· than if he had not loved y in the first place. For love is a pleasure (by the note on 13) which x (by 28) tries his utmost to preserve; and (by the note on 13) he does this by regarding y as present and by giving y as much pleasure as he can (by 21). This effort (by 37) is great in proportion to the greatness of the love x has for y, as is x’s effort to bring it about that y loves him in return (see 33). But, by the corollary to 13 and 23, x’s hatred towards y hinders these efforts; therefore, the lover x will (by the note on 11) get unpleasure from this cause also, and the more so as his love was greater. That is, apart from the unpleasure that was the cause of x’s hate, another unpleasure arises from his having loved y. And consequently he will regard y with greater unpleasure - that is (by the note on 13), he will have a greater hatred for y - than if he had not loved y. And this hate will be the greater as the love was greater. 39: If someone hates someone else, he will try to do evil to him, ·that is, to harm him·, unless he is afraid that this would bring a greater harm to himself; and the same mechanism brings it about that if someone loves someone else he will try to benefit him. To hate someone (by the note on 13) is to imagine him as the cause of one’s unpleasure; and so (by 28), someone who hates someone will try to remove or destroy him. But if he is afraid that that would lead to something more unpleasant that is, more harmful - for himself, and thinks he can avoid this by not harming the one he hates in the way he was planning, he will want to abstain from doing that harm (by 28 again) - and (by 37) he will put more effort into this abstention than there was in his drive to do harm. So this greater effort will prevail, as 39 says. 73 The second part of this demonstration proceeds in the same way. Note on 39: By ‘good’ here ·in this book· I understand every kind of pleasure and whatever leads to it, and especially what satisfies any kind of longing. By ‘evil’ ·I understand here· every kind of unpleasure, and especially what frustrates longing. For I have shown above (in the note on 9) that we don’t want a thing because we judge it to be good, but on the contrary we call it ‘good’ because we want it; and so what we are averse to we call ‘evil’. So each person on the basis of his own affect judges (evaluates) what is good or bad, better or worse, best or worst. The greedy man judges wealth as best and poverty as worst. The ambitious man wants public acclaim more than anything else, and fears disgrace above all. To the envious nothing is more agreeable than another’s unhappiness, and nothing more burdensome than another’s happiness. And so each one judges a thing good or bad, useful or useless, on the basis of his own affect, . The affect by which a man is so disposed that he doesn’t do what he would like to do, and does do what he would prefer not to do, is called ‘timidity’, which is therefore just fear that disposes a man to put up with an evil in order to avoid a greater evil that he thinks is threatening (see 28). If the feared greater evil is shame, then the man’s timidity is called his ‘sense of shame’. Finally, if the desire to avoid a future evil is hindered by timidity regarding another evil, so that the man doesn’t know what he would rather do, then his fear is called ‘consternation’, particularly if each evil he fears is of the greatest. 40: Someone who imagines he is hated by someone, and thinks he has given the other no cause for hate, will hate the other in return. Someone x who imagines someone y to have hatred ·towards something· will thereby also have hatred (by 27), that is (by the note on 13), will have unpleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause. But in the present case the only cause x imagines for this unpleasure of his is the person y who hates him. So from imagining himself to be hated by y he will come to have unpleasure accompanied by the idea of y, which is to say that he will hate y in return. Note on 40: Another source of this returning of hatred for hatred is the fact that hatred is followed by a effort to harm the person who is hated (by 39). Because of that, a person who imagines that someone hates him will imagine the other to be the cause of harm, that is of unpleasure. So he will have unpleasure - specifically, fear - accompanied by the idea of the hater as its cause, which is to say that he will hate the person in return. (If the ma...
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This note was uploaded on 03/12/2013 for the course PHIL 105 taught by Professor Mendetta during the Spring '13 term at SUNY Stony Brook.

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