Final Paper

The assertion that president truman was justified in

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Unformatted text preview: war ‘would have certainly have furnished this pretext, and would have been sufficient to convince all responsible leaders that surrender was unavoidable’ (Alperovitz 16 ­ 17).” This line of reasoning, however, is particularly flawed. The basis of these assertions come from analysts who judged the capacity of the Japanese based on ammunition and supplies, disregarding the Japanese culture and determined nature of every soldier and citizen in Japan at the time. These analysts judged the surrender of the Japanese based on numbers and figures rather than on the unshaking resolve of the nation that had already been displayed. Even if the bombs had not been dropped, there is no way to predict if the peace ­seeking leaders would have been able to convince the “die ­hard Army Group” to surrender. Alperovitz disregards the culture of Japan at the time in assuming that they would surrender in the face of a combined, two ­front, Russian ­American invasion. Further critiques of Alperovitz’s work cite his lack of holistic views and disregard of contrary evidence as detrimental to the argument opposing nuclear strikes on Japan. In a review of Alperovitz’s books, D.M. Giangreco discusses the arguments made by Alperovitz as a whole, stating that his work “recapitulates Atomic Diplomacy and adds little new to the mix except redundancies, extraneous material, and a generous amount of smoke.” Giangreco attributes the success of Alperovitz to his sense of timing, publishing his book at the height of government skepticism during the conflict of Vietnam. Giangreco continues his analysis, disproving the main points of Alperovitz with additional sources, adding that, “Alperovitz supplies very little of...
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