GraduateGameTheoryLecture-SignalingGames - Game Theory Lecture 7 Signaling Games Prof John Patty 1 Classical Signaling Games Sender knows Receiver's

GraduateGameTheoryLecture-SignalingGames - Game Theory...

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Game Theory Lecture 7 Signaling Games Prof. John Patty 1
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Classical Signaling Games: Sender: knows Receiver’s preferences state of nature ω , chooses message , m Receiver: knows Sender’s preferences, distribution of ω Observes message, Infers state of nature, Chooses action, x . Set of players: N = { S,R } 2
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Ω : set of state of nature F : distribution function governing ω M : set of messages ( M Ω ) X : set of receiver’s actions Payoff function for i { S,R } : u i Ω × M × X R 3
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Equilibrium Analysis of Signaling Games m * Ω Δ ( M ) : equilibrium strategy of sender x * M Δ ( X ) : equilibrium strategy of receiver μ * M Δ ( Ω ) : equilibrium beliefs of receiver 1st Key Equilibrium Condition: Incentive Compatibility : For each ω Ω , u S ( ω,m * ( ω ) ,x * ( m * ( ω )) u S ( ω,m ,x * ( m ) 4
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Equilibrium Analysis of Signaling Games m * Ω Δ ( M ) : equilibrium strategy of sender x * M Δ ( X ) : equilibrium strategy of receiver μ * M Δ ( Ω ) : equilibrium beliefs of receiver
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  • Spring '11
  • JohnPaddy
  • Game Theory, Trigraph, equilibrium strategy, DU EL, Key Equilibrium Condition

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