Philosophy 11-28

Philosophy 11-28 - Notes 11/28/07 Objection2: Daniel...

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Notes 11/28/07 Objection2: Daniel Dennett’s objection: there’s no reason a physicalist should ever accept premise 1 of KA (given the way Jackson sets up the Mary story). Dennett: it’s consistent with physicalism that knowledge of some physical facts requires some first-hand experience (scientific practice assumes this!) Jackson’s reply to Dennett: Every physical fact is an objective fact. No qualia-fact is an objective fact. So, no qualia-fact is a physical fact. (Nagel) David Lewis on “Knowing What it’s Like” Lewis’s comments on the debate: o Physicalists should agree with Nagel and Jackson (N and J) that in order to have a complete science of the mind, every fact about minds must be a physical fact o But N and J use such “tendentious jargon” (e.g., what it’s like, subjective character, qualia, raw feel, etc.) o This makes it difficult to figure out what the neutral terms of the debate are o If the concepts of what it’s like, qualia, etc. are taken at the outset to NOT
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This note was uploaded on 04/07/2008 for the course PHIL 1 taught by Professor Lewis during the Fall '08 term at UCSB.

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Philosophy 11-28 - Notes 11/28/07 Objection2: Daniel...

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