philosopy 10-29

philosopy 10-29 - 10/29 The Conceivability Argument 1. It...

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10/29 The Conceivability Argument 1. It is conceivable that my mind exists without my body (evil genius scenario) 2. So, it is possible that my mind exists without my body (1, Conceivability entails possibility) 3. So, my mind is not identical to my body (2, EP) 4. So, my mind and my body are distinct. (3) An Objection to the Conceivability Argument The characteristic assumption of the argument (that conc. Entails poss.) is false : conceiving that P is not sufficient for it being logically possible that P. Counter-example 1: true statements of numerical identity (x=x, x=y) are necessary truths (i.e., it is not logically possible for them to be false). o Lois Lane can conceive that Clark Kent is not Superman. But Clark Kent=Superman, hence it is not logically possible for Clark Kent to not be Superman. So, we have a case of conceiving that P, without it also being true that P is logically possible. So conceivability is not sufficient for possibility Counter-example2
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This note was uploaded on 04/07/2008 for the course PHIL 1 taught by Professor Lewis during the Fall '08 term at UCSB.

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