Unformatted text preview: , Irshad, pp 98-99; As for the question whether a command requires immediate or delayed performance, it is once again observed that the command itself merely consists of a demand, and the manner of its performance must be determined in the light of indications and surrounding circumstances. When, for example, A tells B to 'do such and such now', or alternatively orders him to `do such and such tomorrow', both orders are valid and there is no contradiction. However, if a command were to require immediate execution then the word `now' In the first order would be superfluous just as the word `tomorrow' in the second order would be contradictory. When a person commands another to `bring me some water' while he is thirsty, then by virtue of this indication, the command requires immediate performance just as the order to 'collect the rent' when it is given, say, in the middle of the month while the rent is collected at the end of each month, must mean delayed performance. It is thus obvious that the commandant may specify a particular time in which the command must be executed. The time limit may be strict or it may be flexible. If it is flexible, like the command to perform the obligatory salah, then performance may be delayed until the last segment of the prescribed time. But if the command itself specifies no time limit, such as the order to perform an expiation (kaffarah), then execution may be delayed indefinitely within the expected limits of one's lifetime. However, given the uncertainty of the time of one's death, an early performance is recommended,, regard to kaffarat. [12. Shawkani, Irshad, pp.99-100; Badran, Usul, pp.365-366.] And lastly the question arises as to whether a command to do something implies the prohibition of its opposite. According to the majority view, a command to do something does imply the prohibition of its opposite regardless as to whether the opposite in question consists of a single act or of a plurality of acts. Thus when a person is ordered to move, he is in the meantime forbidden to remain still; or when a person is ordered to stand, he is forbidden from doing any of a number of opposing acts such as sitting, crouching, lying down, etc. However, some ulema, including al-Juwayni, al-Ghazali, Ibn al-Hajib and the Mu'tazilah, have held that a command does not imply the prohibition of its opposite. A group of the Hanafi and Shafi'i ulema have held that only one of the several opposing acts, whether known or unknown, is prohibited, but not all. [13. Shawkani, Irshad, pp.101-102.] The result of such differences would obviously have a bearing on whether the person who commits the opposite of a command must be penalized, and if so, to what extent. Specific answers to such questions can obviously only be determined in the light of the surrounding circumstances and the state of mind of the individual concerned, as well as the general objectives of the Lawgiver/commander that can be ascertained in a given command. II. Prohibitions Prohibition (nahy), being the opposite of a command, is...
View Full Document
This note was uploaded on 04/13/2013 for the course ISLAM 101 taught by Professor Islam during the Spring '13 term at Harvey Mudd College.
- Spring '13