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Unformatted text preview: 목표설정과정에 피평가자가 참여하는 정도에 따라 톱니현상이 다르게 나타나는
데, 이는 정보우위에 있는 피평가자가 목표설정에 보다 깊이 참여할수록 차기목표가 달성하
기 쉽도록 설정될 가능성이 크다는 것을 시사한다. 또한 공공기관의 경영평가제도에서 지속
적 성과개선 보다는 일시적 성과개선을 유도하거나 정부정책 및 거시경제 상황을 반영하는
목표설정이 일어날 가능성을 시사한다. 한글색인어: 목표설정, 참여적 목표설정, 톱니현상, 비대칭적 톱니현상, 지속적 성과개선 ABSTRACT: How to set targets is a crucial factor in the successful implementation
of performance-evaluation and compensation plans. The primary use of targets is
to coordinate the allocation of resources and to evaluate performance (Ittner and
Larcker 2001; Leone and Rock 2002). Targets are also a key component of management
control systems; the way firms set targets, the way they revise them over time,
and the ease with which ratees achieve those targets affect their incentives to
increase firm value (Indjejikian and Nanda 2002). More challenging targets lead higher performance by motivating employee to be more productive (Stedry 1960;
Stedry and Kay 1966; Rockness 1977; Chow 1983). The first-best strategy to maximize
firm value may be to set a target that approximates employees’ true capability.
Though target-setting is important and pervasive in performance-evaluation system,
evidence concerning target-setting practice is scant because researchers rarely have access to such inherently firm-specific and often confidential internal information
(Ittner and Larcker 2001). This paper investigates how targets are set by using a
variety of empirical models coupled with performance evaluation data of the Korean Government-owned enterprises (GOEs).
First, we follow the simple framework developed by Indjejikian and Nanda (2002),
which assume that a firm’s executive works for two periods and the firm rewards
the executive based on a measure of his performance evaluated relative to a target.
This framework also assume that a target depends only past targets and past
performance. Thus, under the framework, if the firm does not adjust the target for
the executive’s past performance, then target at any period is timeless and does
not depend on prior period’s performance. We provide empirical evidence that ratees’
chance of achieving their targets depend on whether the ratees’ performance exceeded
their targets in the previous year. This findings suggest that raters do not adjust 성과평가시스템에서의 목표설정 185 targets to fully reflect ratees’ past performance.
Second, we examine whether the ratchet principle is implemented in the performance
evaluation system of Korean GOEs. The ratchet principle is the well-known tendency
of raters to use current performance as a criterion for determining future...
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This document was uploaded on 09/24/2013.
- Fall '13