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Unformatted text preview: pg. 345373, “Rational Appeasement”, JSTOR, PS)
This article argues that the common presumption against appeasement is far too ¶ strong. The standard treatments leave out one factor that is crucial in international politicsresource constraints. If resources are limited and a state faces many potential¶ threats, appeasing one challenger may actually increase a state's ability to¶ deter others. When conflict is costly, defenders face a tradeoff: fighting may enhance ¶ their reputation for resolve, but it will deplete their resources to fightor ¶ deterfuture challenges.3 Often, the latter effect outweighs the former, prompting ¶ a strategy I call "rational appeasement." If even highly resolved incumbents rationally¶ appease, observers do not impute low resolve to appeasers. Moreover, when ¶ fighting depletes enforcement resources, a refusal to appease can undermine the ¶ state's deterrent. This insight applies to actors as diverse as states facing international¶ challenges, empires fearing subject rebel...
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- Summer '12