Appeasement DA 2 - Michigan7 2013

Soitishugecashcowfortheotherwisehard

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Unformatted text preview: this is true if fighting is very costly to the center . By contrast, under these ¶ conditions appeasing the first challenger will conserve resources sufficient to deter ¶ the second. More ev – your argument cherry­picks the data – engagement only fails with nations that are hardwired against the US, which isn’t Latin America (otherwise they’d say no to the aff, too) Record ‘05 Jeffrey Record is a professor in the Department of Strategy and International Security at the U.S. Air Force’s Air War College in Montgomery, Alabama, (Jeffrey, “APPEASEMENT RECONSIDERED: INVESTIGATING THE MYTHOLOGY OF THE 1930s”, Strategic Studies Institute, August, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub622.pdf)//RS No historical event has exerted more influence on post­World War ¶ II U.S. use­of­ force decisions than the Anglo­French appeasement of ¶ Nazi Germany that led to the outbreak of the Second World War. ¶ Presidents have repeatedly cited the great lesson of the 1930s—namely, ¶ that force should be used early and decisively against rising security...
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This note was uploaded on 10/27/2013 for the course DEBATE 101 taught by Professor None during the Summer '12 term at University of California, Berkeley.

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