Philosophy 11-14

Philosophy 11-14 - Philosophy 11/14/07 Searle on Artificial...

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Unformatted text preview: Philosophy 11/14/07 Searle on Artificial Intelligence: What psychological and philosophical significance should we attach to recent efforts at computer simulations of human cognitive capacities? Weak A.I.: comp. simulations of human mind provide us with a powerful tool that we can use more rigorously and precisely to test intelligence Strong A.I.: the appropriately programmed computer really IS a mind and such a program would thereby explain human cognition The Scope of Searles Criticisms of Strong A.I. Other views that are challenged by Searles criticisms: (1) Turings Thesis : Passing the Turing Test with respect to some linguistic behavior type B is sufficient for being intelligent with respect to B. A corollary of Turings Thesis: If a competent human judge cannot distinguish between the linguistic behavior B exhibited by a non-human physical system and a competent human, then the human is intelligent with respect to B if the non-human physical system is....
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This note was uploaded on 04/07/2008 for the course PHIL 1 taught by Professor Lewis during the Fall '08 term at UCSB.

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Philosophy 11-14 - Philosophy 11/14/07 Searle on Artificial...

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