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Unformatted text preview: e will without regard to the ends which can be attained by the action. For the will stands between its a priori principle, which is formal, and its a posteriori spring, which is material, as between two roads, and as it must be determined by something, it that it must be determined by the formal principle of volition when an action is done from duty, in which case every material principle has been withdrawn from it. AT LEAST SOME THINGS HAVE INTRINSIC VALUE UNRELATED TO THEIR ENDS Bernard Williams, Professor of Philosophy at the University of California-Berkeley, CONSEQUENTIALISM AND ITS CRITICS, 1988, p. 21-2. If not everything that has value has it in virtue of consequences, then presumable there are some types of thing which have non-consequential value, and also some particular things that have such value because they are instances of such types. Let us say, using a traditional term, that anything that has that sort of value, has intrinsic value. I take it to be the central idea of consequentialism that the only kind of thing that has intrinsic value is states of affairs, and that anything else that has value has it because it conduces to some intrinsically valuable state of affairs. SLHS Value File ACTING OUT OF A UNIVERSAL DUTY OUTWEIGHS PRACTICAL WORTH Immanuel Kant, Philosopher, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS, 1785, p. np., Politics Hypertext Library, Accessed 5/20/98, http://www.swan.ac.uk/poli/ texts/kant/kantcon.htm. I do not, therefore, need any far-reaching penetration to discern what I have to do in order that my will may be morally good. Inexperienced in the course of the world, incapable of being prepared for all its contingencies, I only ask myself: Canst thou also will that thy maxim should be a universal law? If not, then it must be rejected, and that not because of a disadvantage accruing from it to myself or even to others, but because it cannot enter as a principle into a possible universal legislation, and reason extorts from me immediate respect for such legislation. I do not indeed as yet discern on what this respect is based (this the philosopher may inquire), but at least I understand this, that it is an estimation of the worth which far outweighs all worth of what is recommend...
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