Values File

If not then it must be rejected and that not because

Info iconThis preview shows page 1. Sign up to view the full content.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.

Unformatted text preview: is having ethical intentions without considering the consequences, because any result of any action is influenced by uncontrollable variables. " Es ist uberall nichts in der Welt, ja uberhaupt auch auBer derslben zu denken moglich. was ahne Einschrankung fur gut konnte gehalten werden, als allein ein guter Wille." ("A good intention is the only thing which can be seen as truly ethical.") DEONTOLOGY INSPIRES DUTY AND OBLIGATION We should always act in the way we want the world to be morally. Carolyn Wiley, associate professor of management at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga, INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT, January, 1995, p. 22. Personal intentions can be translated into personal duties or obligations because those who sincerely wish the best for others will always act in ways to ensure beneficial results. These ways become duties that are incumbent upon us rather than choices that are open to us. For example, it may become our duty to tell the truth, our duty to adhere to contracts, and our duty not to take property that belongs to others. AN ACTION DERIVES ITS MORAL WORTH NOT FROM EFFECT, BUT INTENT Immanuel Kant, Philosopher, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS, 1785, p. np., Politics Hypertext Library, Accessed 5/20/98, http://www.swan.ac.uk/poli/ texts/kant/kantcon.htm. The second proposition is: That an action done from duty derives its moral worth, not from the purpose which is to be attained by it, but from the maxim by which it is determined, and therefore does not depend on the realization of the object of the action, but merely on the principle of volition by which the action has taken place, without regard to any object of desire. It is clear from what precedes that the purposes which we may have in view in our actions, or their effects regarded as ends and springs of the will, cannot give to actions any unconditional or moral worth. In what, then, can their worth lie, if it is not to consist in the will and in reference to its expected effect? It cannot lie anywhere but in the principle of th...
View Full Document

Ask a homework question - tutors are online