Unformatted text preview: lth and power, the private rights regime implemented a frightening dependence on the arbitrary wills of those who had them. The classical labor contract enforced a wide-ranging arbitrary power in the employer over the life of the worker. When the worker became unemployable for economic or health reasons, the classical regime left him at the legally unconstrained mercy of neighbors, charities, or the state. Every safeguard of security in the classical regime corresponded to a form of insecurity. For example, in protecting employers against claims for worker injuries or unemployment, it left workers vulnerable to the unpredictable contingencies of ill health and the business cycle. In securing the property and contract rights of workers and entrepreneurs, it made these same rights vulnerable to destruction in the competitive process of the market. Both workers and capitalists would periodically find the value of their skills and capital reduced or destroyed through innovation or price-cutting by competitors exercising their own rights of property and contract. RIGHTS MODELING TEARS NATIONS APART, CAUSING CONFLICT John A Gentry, retired Army officer, researcher and writer on defense and security issues, 2004. HUMAN RIGHTS: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS, p. 52. The proliferation of human rights is a boon for rights-oriented bureaucracies and trial lawyers, but it damages the social fabric that turns groups of people into communities and communities into a nation. Because the only asset any government ultimately has is its legitimacy, the cost of a government's inability to satisfy rights-based demands is overwhelming. That cost rises further when governments, and the political parties that seek to control them, favor some rights over competing claims to please political backers or to curry favor with voters. HUMAN RIGHTS DETRACT FROM POLITICAL DIALOGUE AND COMPROMISE John A Gentry, retired Army officer, researcher and writer on defense and security issues, 2004. HUMAN RIGHTS: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS, p. 52-53. Exces...
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This document was uploaded on 11/20/2013.
- Fall '13