Values File

This does not reveal a callousness toward life for the

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Unformatted text preview: , for example, that one is faced with a problem because violating someone's rights would in this case produce better results on a whole than would respecting them. I do not think that it is only consequentialists who think of matters in these terms, and unless it can be shown that there is something incoherent about any interpersonal aggregation of benefits and burdens, I see no reason to deny us this way of speaking and conceiving about the matter. SLHS Value File Consequentialism does not reduce humans to mere numbers, nor does it dehumanize. Eric Rakowski "Taking and Saving Lives" Columbia Law Review, Vol. 93, No. 5, (Jun., 1993), pp. 1063-1156 Published by: Columbia Law Review Association, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1122960 "On one side, it presses toward the consequentialist view that individuals' status as moral equals requires that the number of people kept alive be maximized. Only in this way, the thought runs, can we give due weight to the fundamental equality of persons; to allow more deaths when we can ensure fewer is to treat some people as less valuable than others. Further, killing some to save others, or letting some die for that purpose, does not entail that those who are killed or left to their fate are being used merely as means to the well-being of others, as would be true if they were slain or left to drown merely to please people who would live anyway. They do, of course, in some cases serve as means. But they do not act merely as means. Those who die are no less ends than those who live. It is because they are also no more ends than others whose lives are in the balance that an impartial decision-maker must choose to save the more numerous group, even if she must kill to do so."] SLHS Value File Teleology Bad CONSEQUENTIALISM CANNOT PROVIDE A SATISFACTORY CRITERIA FOR MORALITY Alastair Norcross, department of Philosophy, Southern Methodist University, THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, January, 1997, p. 1. I will argue in thi...
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This document was uploaded on 11/20/2013.

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