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Unformatted text preview: tive power (see also Gilpin, 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of
miscalculation (Fearon, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive
environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner, 1999). Separately, Pollins
(1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium
and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain
unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a
significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain
pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future tra...
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