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Unformatted text preview: h Suppose BIOS code is updated by a firmware update. How would the system enable access to blobs previously sealed to current BIOS version? Patch process must re- seal all blobs with new PCR values Dan Boneh A cloud application Client VM sealed to VMM [JPBM’10] cloud servers VMM TPM Client seals VM to VMM measurement: •  VM code and data are encrypted •  Can only be decrypted on valid cloud server •  Cloud operator cannot easily access data Dan Boneh Trusted Compu2ng Security? Dan Boneh Security? [Kauer 2007] A3ack 1: reset TPM aHer boot with a wire •  Connect LRESET pin to ground - - mimics TPM_Init on LPC bus –  then extend PCRs arbitrarily •  Harder in TPM 1.2 due to “locality” A3ack 2: block TPM un2l aHer boot, then extend PCRs arbitrarily •  Root of trust: BIOS boot block resets PCRs (calls TPM_Startup) –  Defeated with one byte change to BIOS boot block !! Dan Boneh Better root of trust •  DRTM – Dynamic Root of Trust Measurement –  AMD: skinit Intel: senter –  Atomically does: •  Reset CPU. Reset PCR 17 to 0. •  Load the given Secure Loader (SL) code into I- cache (locked) •  Extend PCR 17 with SL •  Jump to SL •  BIOS boot loader is no longer root of trust. Processor microcode is. •  Avoids TPM_Init a_ack: TPM_Init sets PCR 17 to - 1 Dan Boneh Other problems Roll- back a_ack on encrypted blobs •  Example: undo security patches without being no2ced. Can be mi2gated using Data Integ...
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