Tcg solu2ons privacy ca online trusted party group

Info iconThis preview shows page 1. Sign up to view the full content.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.

Unformatted text preview: how it works A_esta2on Request (20- byte challenge) App OS TPM PC •  Generate pub/priv key pair •  TPM_Quote(AIK, PcrList, chal, pub- key) •  Obtain cert (SSL) Key Exchange using Cert Communicate with app using SSL tunnel Validate: 1.  Cert issuer, 2.  PCR vals in cert •  A_esta2on typically includes key- exchange Remote Server •  App must be isolated from rest of system Dan Boneh What would go wrong if communica2on between app. and server were done in the clear? User can reboot machine aHer a_esta2on and run arbitrary soHware pretending to be app. Dan Boneh Trusted Compu2ng Using Attestation Dan Boneh Attesting to VMs: Terra [GPCRB’03] TVMM Provides isola2on between a_ested applica2ons •  sample app: secure login into a corporate network Dan Boneh Nexus OS (Sirer et al. ’06) Problem: a_es2ng to hashed applica2on/kernel code –  Too many possible soHware configura2ons Be_er approach: a_es2ng to proper2es –  Example: “applica2on never writes to disk” Nexus OS: General a_esta2on statements: “TPM says that it booted Nexus, Nexus says that it ran checker with hash X, checker says that isola2on domain A has property P” Dan Boneh EFF: Owner Override TCG a_esta2on: •  The good: enables user to prove to remote bank that machine is up- to- date •  The bad: content owners can release decryp2on key only to machines running...
View Full Document

This note was uploaded on 12/27/2013 for the course CS 159 taught by Professor Peterschmidt during the Fall '13 term at Stanford.

Ask a homework question - tutors are online