Credit steven sinofsky why is this needed

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Unformatted text preview: “authorized” soHware. –  S2fles innova2on in player design EFF: allow users to inject chosen values into PCRs. •  Enables users to conceal changes to their compu2ng environment •  Defeats malicious soHware changes to compu2ng plaSorm Dan Boneh TCG Alternatives IBM 4758: Supports all TCG func2onality and more. –  Tamper resistant 486 100MhZ PCI co- processor –  … but expensive ~ $2000. TPM ~ $7. AEGIS System: Arbaugh, Farber, Smith ’97: –  Secure boot with BIOS changes only. –  Cannot support sealed storage. SWATT: Seshadri et al., 2004 –  A_esta2on w/o extra hardware –  Server must know precise HW configura2on Dan Boneh Trusted Compu2ng Attestation: challenges Dan Boneh 1. Attesting to Current State •  A_esta2on only a_ests to what code was loaded. •  Does not say whether running code has been compromised. –  Problem: what if Quake vulnerability exploited aHer a_esta2on took place? •  Can we a_est to the current state of a running system? –  … or is there a be_er way? Dan Boneh 2. Encrypted viruses Suppose malicious music file exploits bug in video player. –  Video file is encrypted. –  TCG prevents anyone from ge~ng video file in the clear. –  Can an2- virus companies study virus without seeing its code in the clear? –  How would you solve this? Dan Boneh 3. TPM Compromise Suppose one TPM Endorsement Private Key is exposed –  Destroys all a_esta2on infrastructure: •  Embed private...
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This note was uploaded on 12/27/2013 for the course CS 159 taught by Professor Peterschmidt during the Fall '13 term at Stanford.

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