Topic5-MalayMondal

This will keep the interest of owner manager and

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Unformatted text preview: der aspects like rewarding executives for contributing organizational learning etc. Another approach may be to do peers comparison while rewarding the managers. Like in case of debt, equity combined plan, set the strike price of option in proportion to the ratio of the company’s performance to the industry performance. This will keep the interest of owner, manager and stakeholders secure and at par. 10 | P a g e Appendix I: Problematic Issues of ESO 11 | P a g e References 1. Rebeiz (2009), "Rethinking Executive Stock Options Plans", International Journal of Business Research 2. Edmans, Liu (2010), “Inside Debt”, Review of Finance, Working paper 3. Sundaram, Yermack (2007), “Pay me later: Inside debt and its role in managerial compensation”, The Journal of Finance 4. Choe, Yin (2006), “Should executive stock options be abandoned?”, Australian Journal of Management 5. Bebchuk, Fried (2010), “Paying for long term performance”, Harvard Paper 6. Bebchuk, Cohen, Spamann (2010), “The wages of failure: Executive compensation at Bear Sterns and Lehman 2000-2008”, Harvard Paper 7. Bebchuk, Spamann (2010), “Regulating the bankers’ pay”, Harvard Paper 8. Cohen, Hall et al (2000), Do executive stock options encourage risk-taking?”, Harvard University 9. http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/5292 10. http://money.cnn.com/2010/07/02/news/companies/aig_executives_compensation_debt.fortun e/index.htm 11. http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010‐06‐24/aig‐ties‐some‐pay‐to‐debt‐part‐of‐effort‐to‐ retain‐executives.html 12. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010‐06‐15/bank‐bonuses‐should‐also‐be‐linked‐to‐bond‐ values‐harvard‐s‐bebchuk‐says.html 13. http://blog.haygroup.com/?p=470 12 | P a g e...
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