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Unformatted text preview: apabilities to conduct information, deception, and
sabotage activities. Expanding the supply distribution and cache networks. Expanding guerrilla training programs for new recruits or on new materiel supplied by the
SFODA, such as mortars, antitank systems, machine guns, demolitions, medical gear, CBRNE
protective gear, and so on. Developing mechanisms and networks to support evasion and recovery of coalition forces, such
as downed airmen.
3-24. During this phase, the resistance force may conduct limited offensive operations to gain confidence
and experience, to procure needed materiel and supplies, or to confuse and harass the enemy forces in their
area. However, the emphasis remains on developing the resistance infrastructure to support future
operations. The resistance leadership must not let the organization expand beyond its organic capability to
3-25. All parties must carefully consider the type and scope of future combat operations that are likely to
achieve each organization’s desired plans, as well as the plans of the overarching resistance C2 in
conjunction with or supporting U.S. efforts. All levels of command must be aware of the theater
commander’s intent for resistance combat operations. During isolation planning, units may focus on some
strategic- to tactical-level targets. It is unlikely the unit would have had the fidelity to determine
appropriate objectives and targets that achieve the theater commander’s desired effects before linkup with
the resistance leadership. After advisors and the resistance leadership agree upon a support plan for the
overall UW campaign, they must determine which actual targets achieve the desired goals.
3-26. The first step toward determining appropriate targets, objectives, and other supporting efforts is to
establish an understanding of the enemy’s capabilities and intentions. What are the enemy’s tactical,
operational, and strategic capabilities and efforts to ensure control over the population? What are the
enemy’s centers of gravity? What are the enemy’s psychological vulnerabilities? Where is the enemy...
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This document was uploaded on 01/15/2014.
- Winter '14