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Unformatted text preview: to support the objectives of the U.S. unified commander, mindful that resistance objectives are
rarely identical to those of the United States.
3-37. Some planners assume the goal is to enable resistance forces to transform and equate to additional
conventional infantry units. It is the responsibility of the SF HQ to ensure that campaign planners
understand the capabilities and limitations of the resistance forces, as well as the associated advantages and
3-38. As conventional forces near areas with resistance forces, the SF HQ coordinates linkup between the
two forces. Planners arrange how linkup will occur before the SFODA’s infiltration. Successful linkup is
critical to avoid friendly-fire incidents and to give the maneuver commander the benefit of the resistance
force’s intimate knowledge of the local environment. This normally requires the placement of an element
with the advancing conventional force HQ. After linkup, resistance forces revert to some variety of
coalition or national control. These forces may demobilize or transition to a regular military or security
force. Possible missions include employment as— Rear-area security of critical installations and LOC choke points. Scouts and guides assigned to coalition conventional units. PHASE SEVEN—TRANSITION
3-39. Elements conduct UW until they remove the hostile power and the indigenous population becomes
the government. At this point, it is critical to shift mindsets from defeating the adversary regime to 30 November 2010 TC 18-01 3-7 Chapter 3 protecting the newly installed government and its security personnel from insurgency, lawlessness, and
subversion by former regime elements that attempt to organize resistance. Planners should have addressed
transition planning in the feasibility assessment that formed the basis of the determination to support the
resistance organization. Elements must honor their commitment to promises made before transition.
Resistance forces are more likely to demobilize or transition if— The postconflict government r...
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This document was uploaded on 01/15/2014.
- Winter '14