Miso may also increase dissension desertion and

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Unformatted text preview: rational effectiveness. MISO can further exploit enemy reprisals against populations or the guerrillas to separate the population from the enemy government or occupying forces. 3-33. Physical attacks that resistance forces conduct can significantly alter psychological effects during this phase. Planning actions for psychological effect is a deliberate process requiring thorough analysis, detailed coordination, and careful execution. Although this process is time- and labor-intensive, the effects can potentially shape the course of the entire UW operation in a profound manner. SF units on the ground coordinate and synchronize these efforts to ensure a complementary effect, first with partner force and then conventional force efforts. Other supporting efforts may include— Gathering and reporting vital intelligence to coalition forces. Assisting in the evasion and recovery of isolated personnel (downed aircrews). Reconnoitering and receiving airborne, air assault, or amphibious invasion forces. 3-6 TC 18-01 30 November 2010 Concept of Employment 3-34. MISO can enhance the effects of these supporting efforts. They can increase actionable intelligence obtained from key segments of the population through persuasive messages that increase sympathy and support for the resistance movement. Information on rewards and other messages can persuade target groups to aid the evasion and recovery of isolated personnel. In addition, MISO can assist in building local networks that provide support for incoming invasion forces by consistently emphasizing the benefits of supporting the UW effort and highlighting the negative aspects of the enemy government or occupying power. 3-35. In a general-war scenario involving a pending conventional force invasion, planners synchronize combat operations around an undisclosed D-Day. For operations security, planners do not tell SF personnel or resistance forces the specific time and date of D-Day, which makes synchronization particularly critical and challenging. Planners may choose a defining date or event, such as the anniversary of a civil disturbance, to motivate the...
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This document was uploaded on 01/15/2014.

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