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1-35. There are two possible goals of large-scale involvement. The goal is either to facilitate the eventual
introduction of conventional forces or to divert enemy resources away from other parts of the operational area.
1-36. UW forces can function as effective instruments in the psychological preparation of the population
for the introduction of conventional forces. Furthermore, deception and other measures can convince
enemy leaders to divert resources away from the main area of effort when it is not necessary to do so. For
example, the United States can disseminate messages suggesting guerrilla operations will occur in certain
locations, causing enemy leaders to divert their forces away from the actual route of advance to meet a
nonexistent threat. Examples of this type of UW effort by the United States include the following: European and Pacific Theaters (1942–1945). North Korea (1951–1953). Cold War Contingency Plans for Eastern Europe (1952–1989). Kuwait (1990–1991). Afghanistan (2001–2002). Iraq (2002–2003).
1-37. During large-scale UW, operations focus largely on military aspects of the conflict because of the
eventual introduction of conventional forces. The task is normally to disrupt or degrade enemy military
capabilities in order to make them more vulnerable to the pending introduction of conventional invasion
forces. The United States can use actions and messages to increase the disruption and degradation of 30 November 2010 TC 18-01 1-7 Chapter 1 enemy capabilities by lowering their morale and unit cohesion. This can increase desertion, surrender, and
malingering among their ranks. Use of such techniques increases the potential for enemy unit breakdown to
the point of rendering them combat-ineffective.
1-38. Resistance forces assume a one-time greater degree of risk in large-scale involvement scenarios by
exposing almost their entire infrastructure in exchange for the possibility of success and linkup with
friendly coalition forces following an invasion. The ultimate challenge is synchronizin...
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This document was uploaded on 01/15/2014.
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