This preview shows page 1. Sign up to view the full content.
Unformatted text preview: effort. TRANSPORTATION NETWORKS
2-77. The resistance requires the capability to move personnel and logistics safely through enemy
controlled areas. Transportation networks include a compartmentalized series of safe houses or similar
hiding locations. These locations allow the transport of personnel and materiel over long distances under
the control of regional personnel who are familiar with the local enemy security measures. Security
requires a complex series of recognition signals and communications that allow the individual segments to
transfer the personnel and materiel safely with minimum exposure of either compartment to the other.
These networks can also facilitate the evacuation of wounded personnel or personnel evading the enemy,
such as downed airmen. RECRUITMENT NETWORKS
2-78. The insurgency requires new recruits to join all aspects of the movement. The incorporation of these
individuals requires special security measures to prevent the compromise of the components. The
insurgency often sequesters recruits until it can check the recruit’s validity and the recruit can complete
training and possibly participate in an operation to prove his loyalty. INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE NETWORKS
2-79. Aside from normal intelligence collection requirements, the resistance must recruit new members.
The resistance screens new members to ensure they are not infiltrators. Further details are beyond the scope
of this publication. 30 November 2010 TC 18-01 2-19 Chapter 3 Concept of Employment
Insurgents’ actions are similar in character to all others fought by second-rate troops;
they start out full of vigor and enthusiasm, but there is little level-headedness and
tenacity in the long run.
Clausewitz, On War It was a critical task of the special operations executive (SOE) to make sure that, where
level-headedness and tenacity were lacking (among resistance forces), these
characteristics were made available by first-rate organizers (from the SOE), so these
forces could be brought into combat.
M.R. Foot, The SOE 1940–1946 Planning for UW is slightly different from planning for other special operations.
Most SF core missi...
View Full Document
- Winter '14