Unformatted text preview: g resistance efforts
while maintaining a degree of operational security for the invasion.
1-39. If the intent of the UW operation is to develop an area in order to facilitate the entry of an invasion
force, the challenge is to ensure that the operations of the resistance complement (rather than inadvertently
interfere with or even compromise) those of the invasion forces. If the timing is wrong or the conventional
invasion forces fail to liberate the territory and linkup with resistance forces, it is likely that the resistance
organization (guerrillas, underground, and auxiliary personnel) will suffer significant losses.
1-40. With a few exceptions, it is relatively simple for U.S. forces to compel an adversary to commit
forces to an area away from a possible invasion site. The challenge in this scenario is determining which
resistance actions trigger the desirable responses and when to begin those operations to appropriately affect
the adversary’s decision cycle. If U.S. forces do not coordinate these operations with the invasion force or
time the operations incorrectly, they can cause significant negative consequences. LIMITED WAR
1-41. In general, the United States uses limited-involvement operations to pressure an adversary. Examples
of this type of UW effort by the United States include the following: The Baltic States (Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia–1950s). Guatemala (1954). Albania (1949–1954). Tibet (1955–1965). Indonesia (1958). Cuba (1960s). North Vietnam (1961–1964). Afghanistan (1980s). Nicaragua (1980s).
1-42. During limited-involvement missions, the overall operation takes place in the absence of overt or
eventual hostilities from the sponsor. Such operations take on a strategic and sensitive political aspect.
Typically, the United States limits its direct involvement, which mitigates the risks of unintended
consequences or premature escalation of the conflict. During limited-involvement operations, the manner
in which forces operate significantly differs from that of large-scale involvement scenarios. Without the
benefit of a conventi...
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This document was uploaded on 01/15/2014.
- Winter '14