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insurgent groups. It might be the movement’s only clearly defined goal. Some examples of strategic goals
are as follows: Political revolution. Political reformation. Succession. Preservation. Reversion. ENVIRONMENT AND GEOGRAPHY
2-13. The environment and geography (demographics) greatly affect an insurgency’s strategies and tactics.
Insurgencies may form their base in urban environments, rural environments, or a combination of both. By
maintaining a combination of urban cells and rural bases, insurgencies can often take full advantage of the
benefits of both models (urban and rural) without becoming constrained by the shortcomings of either model.
2-14. Insurgents located in rural areas enjoy the relative safety of remote terrain or safe havens, such as
jungles or mountains. These geographical conditions make it possible for them to form larger guerrilla
bands and conduct large-scale guerrilla operations. Disadvantages of a rural base are— Length and speed of communications and supply lines. Displacement of insurgents from the populace. Susceptibility of insurgents to conventional military counterguerrilla operations.
2-15. Urban insurgencies have overcome the lack of suitable restrictive terrain by operating within ethnic
ghettos or enclaves within sympathetic densely populated urban areas. These areas often create safe havens
that HN forces are unwilling or unable to access. This type of urban basing requires a high degree of
compartmentalization, which makes it more difficult for the group to train and organize for large-scale
operations. 30 November 2010 TC 18-01 2-5 Chapter 2 EXTERNAL SUPPORT
2-16. Historically, insurgencies do not succeed without some form of external support. This support can be
in the form of— Moral or political support in the international forum. Resources, such as money, weapons, food, advisors, and training. Sanctuary, such as secure training sites, operational bases over a border, or protection from
2-17. Governments providing support to an insurgency normally shar...
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This document was uploaded on 01/15/2014.
- Winter '14