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Unformatted text preview: y 51 bbls meant that any contamination of the cement by mud could reduce the effective coverage of annular and/or shoe track cement. These decisions by BP and Halliburton with respect to planning and conducting the Macondo production casing cement job were possible contributing causes of the blowout. BP’s well site leaders and the Deepwater Horizon rig crew failed to recognize the accumulating risk associated with several possible anomalies that could have contributed to the shoe track cement’s failure to prevent hydrocarbon ingress into the well. These problems include: The higher pressure needed to convert the float collar from “fill” to “check” (3,142 psi instead of a maximum of 700 psi) could have damaged components of the float collar (including the auto‐fill tube and shear pins); The float collar may not have converted because the crew used an insufficient flow rate and pressure. The float collar was designed to convert at a range between 5 bpm and 7 bpm, while the actual flow rate never exceeded 4.3 bpm; The bottom cement wiper plug that landed on the float collar required 900 psi to 1,100 psi to burst the disk. However, the burst disk did not rupture until 2,900...
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