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Unformatted text preview: iverter and not the mud gas separator was a contributing cause of the response failure. At approximately 9:48 p.m., several of the gas alarms sounded. Within minutes, approximately 20 gas alarms were sounding, the result of extremely high levels of gas concentration. Yancy Keplinger, the senior dynamic positioning officer, went to the video monitor and saw large amounts of mud being ejected. Shortly afterwards, Andrea Fleytas, the dynamic positioning officer, got a call from the rig floor, which informed her that there was a “well control problem.” Fleytas told the Panel she received a phone call from the engine room, but she never told the engine room personnel to perform an emergency shutdown. The initial explosion occurred approximately 30 seconds to a minute after the first gas alarm. At approximately 10:00 p.m., the general alarm and fire alarm on the Deepwater Horizon sounded and the rig began to list to one side. Only then did Keplinger make an announcement to muster and prepare to evacuate. Personnel were not told to...
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This note was uploaded on 01/18/2014 for the course BEPP 305 taught by Professor Nini during the Fall '11 term at UPenn.

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